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JENNIFER NOU

& EDWARD H. STIGLITZ

Regulatory Bundling
abstract. Regulatory bundling is the aggregation or disaggregation of legislative rules by
administrative agencies. Agencies, in other words, can bundle what would otherwise be multiple
rules into just one rulemaking. Conversely, they can split one rule into several. This observation
parallels other recent work on how agencies can aggregate adjudications and enforcement actions
but now focuses on legislative rules, the most consequential form of agency action. The topic is
timely in light of a recent executive order directing agencies to repeal two regulations for every
new one promulgated. Agencies now have a greater incentive to pack regulatory provisions together for every two rules they can repeal.
This Article explores the positive determinants and normative implications of regulatory bundling and unbundling. The empirical analysis reveals that agencies have been increasingly engaging in regulatory bundling for the last two decades. More generally, bundling behavior varies
widely across different administrative agencies, and agencies appear to include more subjects in
their ﬁnal—as opposed to proposed—rules. These ﬁndings, in turn, raise signiﬁcant normative
concerns that could be addressed through a suite of tools novel to the administrative state: singlesubject rules, line-item vetoes, and innovative uses of more traditional doctrines of judicial review.
Whether some of these tools should be adopted, however, requires further empirical assessment
of regulatory bundling’s causes and consequences.
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introduction
Administrative agencies can make policy in myriad ways. They can, for example, choose their form of action: whether a rule, an adjudication, an enforcement, or a guidance document.1 For decades, commenters have analyzed the
positive and normative trade-offs of each.2 More recently, scholars have become
attentive to the ways in which these forms can be aggregated. Some have debated
adjudicatory aggregation through administrative class actions.3 Others have remarked upon “crackdowns,” or the ways in which enforcement actions can be
pursued all at once.4 This lens has shed new light on agency discretion by drawing upon rich analogies to other areas of the law, such as civil procedure, where
aggregation and its discontents are common themes.5
Puzzling, then, that more attention has not been paid to the ways in which
agencies can aggregate perhaps the most consequential tool at their disposal:
legislative rules.6 Like statutes, legislative rules bind entire classes of individu-

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1384
(2004) (noting that a “legislative rule, administrative adjudication, judicial enforcement, or
guidance” document usually comprises the “standard set” of agency policy-making forms).
See, e.g., id. at 1396-97; Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The
Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 272-73 (1987); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 512 (1970); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
See, e.g., Shannon M. Grammel & Joshua C. Macey, The Costs of Aggregating Administrative
Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 123 (2018); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman,
The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1999 (2012) (arguing “that agencies should
adopt aggregation procedures, like a civil class action, to resolve common claims raised by
large groups of people in administrative courts”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 1634 (2017).
See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 33 (2017) (deﬁning a “crackdown” as
“an executive decision to intensify the severity of enforcement of existing regulations or laws
as to a selected class of offenders or a selected set of offenses”); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown:
The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 894 (1987) (describing an “extraordinary enforcement program” against drugs that “set new records in every category of measurement—drug seizures, investigations, indictments, arrests, convictions, and
asset forfeitures”).
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183.
To be sure, the legal literature has recognized that rules can be bundled and split, but has not
given the topic sustained attention. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, AgendaSetting in the Regulatory State: Theory and Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 865, 876 (2016) (observing that some “statutes give greater discretion to agencies to pace their progress in implementing bundles of rules by simply requiring the agency to ﬁnish all of its rulemaking responsibilities by a certain date”); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential
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als.7 And they too can be combined in multiple ways—a phenomenon that we
refer to as regulatory bundling. Regulatory bundling refers to the ability of an
agency to choose the scope of a single rulemaking—the number of discrete issues
to resolve at a given point in time. Bundling decisions can occur at all stages of
the rulemaking process, from drafting to implementation to litigation. For example, an agency can bundle some decisions at the proposed rule stage, only to
split them into distinct ﬁnal rules. It can then reaggregate those issues and revise
them through a subsequent regulation.
Consider some examples:


The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently issued a proposed
rule which, in the Agency’s own words, combined “three distinct actions.”8 Some of these had previously been issued separately, but were
now combined into one proposed rule. The rule’s most high-proﬁle action revised the Agency’s Clean Power Plan, which was an effort by the
Obama Administration to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from coalburning power plants.9 In addition, the rule proposed new requirements
regarding state implementation of the new emissions requirements. Finally, the rule revised the Agency’s New Source Review program, a preconstruction air permitting requirement. Some commented that the
Clean Power Plan revisions were actually “distractions” from the more
consequential New Source Review provisions.10

Review, 126 HARV. L. REV . 1755, 1792 (2013); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994,
995 n.12 (2011) (noting the possibility that agencies split rules into parts to avoid review by
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs). Relatedly, Abbe Gluck, Anne O’Connell,
and Rosa Po remark upon what they call “omnibus rules.” Omnibus rules can be understood
as a subset of the larger category of what we call bundled rules, which includes rules with
unrelated and related provisions. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015).
7.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57
YALE L.J. 919, 919 (1948) (noting that “rule-making is the part of the administrative process
that resembles a legislature’s enactment of a statute”).
8. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating
Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source
Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (proposed Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51, 52, 60).
9. The Clean Power Plan was issued as a ﬁnal rule in October 2015. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed.
Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
10. See, e.g., @AriPeskoe, TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://twitter.com/AriPeskoe
/status/1031984028948328448 [https://perma.cc/Z2JL-PMVK].
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11.
12.
13.

14.

15.

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
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Years earlier, EPA had initially set out to regulate greenhouse gases under
the Clean Air Act through one rulemaking.11 After a change in presidential administration, however, the Agency instead decided to issue four
separate rules addressing different subjects.12 The ﬁrst determined that
carbon dioxide “endangered” the public.13 The second regulated auto
emissions in light of that ﬁnding.14 The third dealt with “triggered” permitting requirements for stationary sources,15 while the fourth “tailor[ed]” the permitting requirements to the largest carbon emissions
sources.16 All of these regulatory decisions could have been packaged
into one rulemaking, but EPA chose to split them into four.17
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) traditionally regulated a single substance at a time.18 Its Air Contaminants Standard rule, however, addressed 428 substances—from sulfur dioxide, to
styrene, to wood and grain dust—all at once.19 After a court struck down
the bundled regulation, OSHA was unable to revise any of the individual
standards, despite efforts to rebundle them in new ways.20

See Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 6, at 1806; Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 507 (2015).
Greve & Parrish, supra note 11, at 507.
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66524 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codiﬁed at 40
C.F.R. ch. 1).
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pts.
85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536-538).
Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean
Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 50, 51, 70, 71).
Prevention of Signiﬁcant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
Greve & Parrish, supra note 11, at 507.
See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 971 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that “[u]nlike most of the
OSHA standards previously reviewed by the courts, the Air Contaminants Standard regulates
not a single toxic substance, but 428 different substances”).
See id.; Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 (Jan. 19, 1989) (to be codiﬁed at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1910).
See John Howard, OSHA Standards-Setting: Past Glory, Present Reality and Future Hope, 14 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 237, 250 (2010) (noting that since the adverse court decision, “OSHA has
been unable to reestablish new [standards] for the substances covered in its former air contaminants” rule, despite efforts to issue a new rule covering twenty substances).

regulatory bundling



In response to patient deaths in ﬁaluridine clinical trials, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) proposed a rule establishing new reporting
requirements for human drug and biological products as well as investigational new drug applications.21 It delayed the issuance of the ﬁnal rule
in response to heavy criticism from commenters, however, and considered breaking up the proposed rules into three separate ﬁnal rules.22 The
FDA ultimately decided to issue guidance documents addressing some
of the issues.23

Each of these scenarios illustrates a form of bureaucratic discretion that we
call regulatory bundling—a practice with underexplored implications for the administrative state.
Indeed, the phenomenon has newfound signiﬁcance after a recent Trump
Administration executive order aimed at reducing regulatory costs.24 The order
contains, among other things, a “two-for-one” requirement, which directs agencies to repeal two regulations for every signiﬁcant new one promulgated.25 Executive agencies now have a greater incentive to pack more regulatory provisions
into one rule because doing so delivers more bang for the buck. Assuming a ﬁxed
amount of offsetting rules at a given time, an agency can regulate more by aggregating more provisions into a single rulemaking.26 If, by contrast, the agency
splits the provisions, it would be forced to ﬁnd two additional rules to repeal.
One would thus expect to see more regulatory bundling after the executive order
went into effect.
21.

22.
23.

24.
25.
26.

Adverse Experience Reporting Requirements for Human Drug and Licensed Biological Products, 59 Fed. Reg. 54046 (proposed Oct. 27, 1994) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 20, 310, 312,
314, 600); see FDA Defers to International Harmonization in Adverse Event Reporting Proposal,
GUIDE TO GOOD CLINICAL PRAC. NEWSL., Dec. 1995, at 6.
FDA Defers to International Harmonization in Adverse Event Reporting Proposal, supra note 21.
See Expedited Safety Reporting Requirements for Human Drug and Biological Products, 62
Fed. Reg. 52237, 52238 (Oct. 7, 1997) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 20, 310, 312, 314, 600)
(“[The FDA] has decided to withdraw the proposed amendments to the [Investigational New
Drug] requirements for clinical study design and conduct and annual sponsor reporting. The
agency will, instead, develop a guidance document providing recommendations on study design and monitoring of investigational drugs used to treat serious and potentially fatal illnesses.”).
Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017).
Id.
There is, of course, an important dynamic element depending on the relevant time horizons.
Given a ﬁnite store of minor regulations sacriﬁced to be part of the two regulations repealed,
in the long run, agencies will have to sacriﬁce their bundled regulations in order to issue a
new regulation. In this manner, bundling rules in response to the executive order could backﬁre.
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As further motivation, consider parallel scholarly observations about the legislative process. Social scientists have long studied the phenomenon of omnibus
bills in Congress, through which legislators bundle numerous, often unrelated,
provisions.27 Positive theories propose that omnibus vehicles allow legislators to
advance partisan agendas, engage in distributive logrolling, or pass otherwise
unpopular measures.28 Normative reformers, in turn, have often called for statutory unbundling. Single-subject rules found in many state constitutions, for
example, limit bills and referenda to one subject.29 The line-item veto similarly
facilitates statutory unbundling by the executive branch.30
This Article explores analogous insights in the regulatory context in the
hopes of spurring a broader research agenda akin to the decades of studies pursued in the legislative arena. The effort here is primarily one of theory building,
and in that spirit we include preliminary empirical analyses to explore intuitions
and generate hypotheses for more rigorous testing in future work. This study
also attempts to complicate existing debates about agency behavior. Take rule
counts. Popular media and academic studies often rely on them to convey the
magnitude of agency regulatory activity.31 But such counting exercises cannot

27.

28.
29.

30.

31.

See, e.g., GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 45
(2001) [hereinafter KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE] (examining the dynamics giving rise to omnibus bills); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS 112 (4th ed. 2012) (identifying examples of omnibus legislation); Johanna
M.M. Goertz, Omnibus or Not: Package Bills and Single-Issue Bills in a Legislative Bargaining
Game, 36 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 547 (2011) (comparing single-issue and omnibus bills in
legislative bargaining); Glen S. Krutz, Getting Around Gridlock: The Effect of Omnibus Utilization on Legislative Productivity, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533 (2000) (assessing omnibus legislation’s
inﬂuence on legislative productivity); Glen S. Krutz, Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in
Congress, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 210 (2001) (studying how and why omnibus bills are created).
See KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE, supra note 27, at 32-33.
See Single Subject Rules, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 8, 2009), http://www.ncsl.org
/research/elections-and-campaigns/single-subject-rules
[https://perma.cc/99LP-EL39].
Many of them require the single subject to be included in the bill’s title. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION & REGULATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 309 (5th ed. 2014).
This mechanism currently permits state governors in about forty-three states to veto “items”
from appropriations bills, subject to legislative override. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at
314.
See, e.g., Thomas J. Donohue, The Regulatory Tsunami--How a Tidal Wave of Regulations Is
Drowning America, U.S. CHAMBER COMM. (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.uschamber.com/press
/speeches/2010/regulatory-tsunami-how-tidal-wave-regulations-drowning-america
[https://perma.cc/5URR-WSX4] (claiming that “approximately 4,000 rules from nearly 70
departments and agencies ﬁlled the regulatory pipeline in 2008”). Academic scholarship also
relies on rule counts, though it is often aware of this measure’s limitations. See, e.g., Anne
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meaningfully capture the scope of an agency’s rulemaking. One rule can set
standards for an entire industry, while another addresses narrow compliance issues. A third might deal with technical or routine matters and have only a temporary effect,32 while a fourth is wholly deregulatory.33 Rule counts are thus often misleading indicators of regulatory activity.
Appreciating agency bundling, however, helps to reﬁne thinking about the
relevant units of analysis. If compliance burdens are a concern, for example, it
may be more sensible to measure costs than to tally rules. Understanding bundling behavior also enriches and complements work on the strategic timing of
agency decisions and the more dynamic aspects of rulemaking behavior.34 Agencies can simply delay controversial provisions, for example, by splitting them
from a particular rule to save for future rulemakings.
Part I analyzes the concept and operationalization of regulatory bundling. It
uses a unique dataset obtained from nearly twenty years of rulemaking across a
wide range of agencies to provide an initial descriptive picture of the dynamic.35

32.

33.

34.

35.

Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 922 n.101 (2008) (acknowledging that a database “looking
at counts of various rulemaking activities” will “miss many details of individual rulemakings”
“because they are aggregate measures”); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing
the Ossiﬁcation Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 19501990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1445 (2012) (describing their database as “essentially
count[ing] the number of [notices of proposed rulemaking] and ﬁnal rules issued by each
agency over time”).
See, e.g., Drawbridge Operation Regulations; China Basin, San Francisco, CA, 78 Fed. Reg.
19585 (Apr. 2, 2013) (to be codiﬁed at 33 C.F.R. pt. 117) (specifying a provisional deviation
from a bridge operating schedule).
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 198 n.41 (1994) (discussing
how it is impossible “for the untutored eye to discern from the reporting in the Uniﬁed
Agenda of Federal Regulations whether activity levels are primarily in a regulatory or deregulatory direction”).
See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1161-62 (2009) (suggesting that
agencies cannot “bury” bad news, but that timing decisions can affect monitoring costs); Rachel Augustine Potter, Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in
Rulemaking, 79 J. POL. 841 (2017) (examining agency timing to avoid oversight); Wendy
Wagner et al., Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183 (2017) (exploring agency incentives
to update and revise rules).
Uniquely, the dataset draws directly from the Federal Register, which is the government’s
“official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of Federal agencies and organizations.” About Federal Register, GOV’T PUB. OFF., http://www.gpo.gov/help/about_federal
_register.htm [https://perma.cc/5YWD-NNVH]. Since agencies must publish in its pages
for their rules to gain legal effect, the Federal Register provides the most comprehensive look
possible at agencies’ rulemaking behavior. See 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2018); O’Connell, supra note
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The results suggest that bundling is increasingly common. Agencies seem more
likely to bundle issues in their rulemaking efforts today than they were even a
short time ago. Moreover, agencies appear to adopt a wide variety of practices
with respect to bundling: some bundle a great deal, and others do so rarely.
Part II explores the various actors internal and external to the agency that
likely inﬂuence the agency’s bundling decisions. It considers the regulatory
drafting process within agencies as well as the ways political and judicial monitors themselves can package and split rules. Basic empirical analysis suggests that
independent and executive agencies bundle differently, perhaps reﬂecting the
meaningful inﬂuence of presidential review coordinated by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In addition, executive agencies appear
to bundle slightly more under divided government; that is, when at least one
house of Congress is of a different political party. Elections also seem to have an
effect in favor of less bundling.
Finally, Part III acknowledges concerns that regulatory bundling raises about
political accountability, public participation, and legislative ﬁdelity. Regulatory
bundling may allow agencies to overwhelm political and judicial overseers, as
well as to short-circuit the notice-and-comment process. Our analysis indeed
suggests that agencies bundle more subjects into ﬁnal, as opposed to proposed,
rules. At the same time, this Part recognizes that bundling yields beneﬁts as well
and recommends further empirical work to assess the trade-offs. In doing so, it
highlights the possibilities and pitfalls of regulatory single-subject rules and the
functional line-item veto exercised by the President through OIRA. Courts may
also have a limited role to play in policing bundling through arbitrary-or-capricious review and the logical-outgrowth doctrine.
i. bundling dynamics
Scholars have long confronted the question of why regulations exist.36 Far
less studied is the question of how agencies regulate through legislative rules.
How do they structure their regulations, disaggregate regulatory obligations un-

31, at 928 (“Publication in the Federal Register is the official means of notifying the public of
new regulations, and agency activity cannot be hidden if agencies expect anyone to comply
with their rules.”); Randy S. Springer, Note, Gatekeeping and the Federal Register: An Analysis
of the Publication Requirement of Section 552(a)(1)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 544 (1989) (“Agency documents that fall within the provisions of the publication rule of section 552(a)(1)(D) and are not so published are ineffective against a party
without actual notice.”).
36. See, e.g., ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 132 (4th ed. 1932) (positing a
public-interest theory of regulation); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (developing an industry-capture theory of regulation).
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der the same statutory grant, or aggregate them across multiple statutory provisions under the auspices of a single rule? This Part tackles some foundational
issues. First, it deﬁnes and operationalizes the concept of regulatory bundling. It
then presents a preliminary empirical overview of the phenomenon across agencies and across time. In doing so, it reveals historical trends in agency behavior
and reﬂects on potential sources of heterogeneity.
A. Concept and Measurement
Regulatory bundling refers to agencies’ discretion to aggregate or disaggregate provisions during a single rulemaking. Put differently, agencies can make
many policy decisions in a rule or simply resolve one policy at a time. That discretion appears to be legislatively blessed: the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) deﬁnes a “rule” as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect.”37 While the legislative history of the
APA is unilluminating,38 the text seems to anticipate that a rule can constitute
either an entire agency statement of generality or just a portion of one. Rules, in
other words, can resolve a set of subjects or simply component parts: the speciﬁcation of a policy question, legal interpretation, enforcement scheme, or penalty structure, to name a few possibilities.
Although the core concept of regulatory bundling is relatively straightforward, it raises challenging analytic and practical questions. Crisply delineating a
“subject” or “issue” is notoriously challenging, as later discussed.39 Equally difﬁcult is deciding how to operationalize the degree of bundling observed: what is
the best way to identify the extent to which an agency has “bundled”? One intu-

37.

5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2018) (emphasis added). Some have written about the APA’s deﬁnition of
a rule, but they do not seem to have focused on the speciﬁc meaning of “whole or a part.” See,
e.g., Sean Croston, It Means what It Says: Deciphering and Respecting the APA’s Deﬁnition of
“Rule,” 53 WASHBURN L.J. 27 (2013); Ronald M. Levin, The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s
Deﬁnition of “Rule,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1077 (2004).
38. The House and Senate committee hearings and reports from the APA’s legislative history focus on the evolution of the “general or particular applicability” provision, but neither the Federal Register Act nor the legislative history materials make any reference to the “whole or a
part” language. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511 (2018); S. REP. NO. 89-813 (1965); H.R. REP. NO.
84-1497 (1955). The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative
Procedure, issued in 1941, was based on extensive research into contemporary practices of
federal administrative agencies and provided much of the framework for the ultimate product.
While the Final Report focused on agencies’ procedures for rulemaking, it never addressed
the deﬁnition of a rule itself. See S. DOC. NO. 77-8 (1941).
39. See infra Section III.B.2.
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itive method might be to rely upon agencies’ own descriptions of their rulemaking efforts. Rules that are explicitly characterized as combinations of previous
rules or that contain the term “omnibus” in the title might be one method.40 But
agencies are under no statutory requirement to label rules accordingly, so relying
on this method is likely to yield inconsistent results. Agencies may also have incentives to characterize rules in ways that do not necessarily map onto any underlying substance. A behavioral deﬁnition is thus likely to be more meaningful.
Our preferred measure of bundling derives from a subject list that agency
officials are required to include in proposed and ﬁnal rules. Since 1982, agencies
must include a “list of subjects” in their rules, where the subjects derive from a
set of standardized terms identiﬁed in a thesaurus known as the Federal Register
Thesaurus of Indexing Terms.41 The Office of the Federal Register (OFR) ﬁrst
proposed the creation of a thesaurus four years earlier as part of a broader effort
to facilitate regulatory monitoring.42 Its initial draft drew upon terms previously
used in indices of the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).43
The Office then consolidated and cross-referenced the terms against other published thesauruses and indices, resulting in a preliminary version published for
public comment.44 The more ﬁnal version was then published in 1981 as a “dynamic document” that would “change through use.”45 In practice, however, revisions have been fairly limited.46

40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

45.
46.

Cf. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE, supra note 27, at 45 (considering deﬁning “omnibus bill” by
reference to the name of the bill, but rejecting that method).
Identiﬁcation of Subjects in Agency Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 7161, 7162 (Jan. 22, 1981) (to
be codiﬁed at 1 C.F.R. pt. 18); see Telephone Interview with Amy Bunk, Dir. of Legal Affairs
& Policy, Office of the Fed. Register, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. (Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Bunk Interview]; Telephone Interview with Brian Swidal, Senior Editor, Office of the
Fed. Register, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. (Apr. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Swidal Interview].
See Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, 42 Fed. Reg. 12985, 12986 (Mar. 7, 1977) (requesting public
comment).
Id. (“The subject terms included in this thesaurus were derived from terms previously used
in Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations indexes.”).
Id. (describing how proposed “terms were reviewed and consolidated and a cross-reference
structure showing the relationships between terms was added,” after which “[v]arious published thesauruses and indexes were consulted in selecting terms and cross-references”).
See Federal Register Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, 46 Fed. Reg. 12617, 12618 (Feb. 17, 1981).
In 1983, the Office added twenty-four new terms based on its two years of experience with
the thesaurus. Some of these terms were used as indexing terms while others were added as
cross-references. See Federal Register Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, 48 Fed. Reg. 27646 (June
16, 1983). Seven years later, the Office similarly added twelve more terms based on suggestions from agencies and staff. See Federal Register Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, 55 Fed. Reg.
38443, 38444 (Sept. 18, 1990). Since then, OFR has added or revised terms on the order of
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The subject-list requirement’s stated purpose was to advance transparency
and encourage public participation.47 The hope was that interested parties could
easily ﬁnd regulations of concern.48 The citizen with “a buzzing seat belt,” for
example, would not have to waste time searching indices for “Cars,” “Automobiles,” and “Motor Vehicles,” but could instead focus on a single standardized
term.49 The effort would also help the government consistently index other publications such as the Federal Register and CFR.50 The Administrative Committee
of the Federal Register presciently noted that these standardized thesaurus terms
could facilitate research and form the basis of a computer database in the future.51
For the past few decades, then, all proposed and ﬁnal rules have included a
list of subjects keyed to a fairly consistent standardized governmental thesaurus.
We collect the subjects listed as a metric of the extent to which a given rule is
“bundled.” The more subjects the rule lists from the thesaurus, the more issues
are bundled into the rule. Consider the EPA’s Clean Power Plan ﬁnal rule issued
under the Obama Administration but now subject to repeal.52 The rule established state emission guidelines for developing plans to reduce greenhouse gas

47.

48.
49.
50.

51.

52.

two to three minor changes a quarter, with a more general organizational (as opposed to substantive) revision in 2016. See E-mail from Brian Swidal, Senior Editor, Office of the Fed.
Register, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., to Jennifer Nou, Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch. (May 10, 2018, 1:17 PM) (on ﬁle with authors).
See Identiﬁcation of Subjects in Agency Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7162 (Jan. 22, 1981)
(to be codiﬁed at 1 C.F.R. pt. 18) (invoking “[t]he public’s right to know about and participate
in their Government and its day-to-day activities”).
Id. (seeking to “provide a framework for information retrieval in the Federal Register system”).
See Standardization of Indexing Terms, 39 Fed. Reg. 14548, 14549 (Apr. 24, 1974).
Identiﬁcation of Subjects in Agency Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. at 7162 (“The identifying terms
provided by the agencies with their regulations will be used at the OFR to expand the existing
indexes to both the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations.”).
Id. (“The use of a controlled vocabulary, a thesaurus, is intended to improve research . . . .
Through the use of automated technology the identifying terms will also be incorporated with
the CFR text in a computerized data base for eventual automated information retrieval.”).
The Clean Power Plan was promulgated in October 2015. See Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). More recently, EPA proposed to
repeal and replace the Clean Power Plan. See Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (proposed Aug. 31,
2018) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60); Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing
the Clean Power Plan, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/stationary
-sources-air-pollution/electric-utility-generating-units-repealing-clean-power-plan
[https://perma.cc/5Q9E-79ML].

1185

the yale law journal

128:1174

2019

emissions from existing power plants.53 It also required states to monitor their
progress and provide periodic reports.54 Accordingly, the ﬁnal rule listed the following subjects: “Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedure, Air pollution control, Intergovernmental relations, [and] Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.”55 Based on this list, our bundling measure would
record a value of ﬁve: the Agency listed ﬁve qualitative subjects.
By contrast, take another ﬁnal rule promulgated by EPA, this time dealing
with hazardous waste.56 In this rule, EPA listed waste generated from the production of identiﬁed dyes; pigments; and food, drug, and cosmetic colorants as
“hazardous” when it exceeded particular thresholds or was not treated or disposed of properly.57 The determination followed three previous proposals on the
discrete issue.58 The rule also addressed a number of other subjects. For example,
it added ﬁve toxic constituents to the list of hazardous constituents that served
as the basis for classifying wastes as hazardous.59 It added another seven constituents to a separate list of hazardous constituents that formed the basis for the
current waste listing. In addition, the rule established land-disposal-restrictions
standards for the identiﬁed wastes and also designated them as hazardous substances subject to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the list of subjects identiﬁed many
more unique subjects than the Clean Power Plan rule discussed earlier: twentysix, to be exact.60

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.5740-.5790 (2018).
Id. §§ 60.5865, 60.5870.
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64941.
Hazardous Waste Management System; Identiﬁcation and Listing of Hazardous Waste; Dyes
and/or Pigments Production Wastes; Land Disposal Restrictions for Newly Identiﬁed
Wastes; CERCLA Hazardous Substance Designation and Reportable Quantities; Designation
of Five Chemicals as Appendix VIII Constituents; Addition of Four Chemicals to the Treatment Standards of F039 and the Universal Treatment Standards, 70 Fed. Reg. 9138 (Feb. 24,
2005) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pts. 148, 261, 268, 271, 302).
Id. at 9141.
Id. at 9143.
Id. at 9142.
The list of subjects included the following nonduplicative terms: Administrative practice and
procedure; Hazardous waste; Reporting and record keeping requirements; Water supply; Environmental protection; Hazardous materials; Waste treatment and disposal; Recycling;
Waste management; Land Disposal Restrictions; Treatment Standards; Conﬁdential business information; Hazardous material transportation; Indians—lands; Intergovernmental relations; Penalties; Water pollution control; Air pollution control; Chemicals; Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act; Extremely hazardous substances; Hazardous
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In this manner, the measure roughly captures the number of issues addressed
in a rulemaking based on the expert judgment of agency officials themselves. A
major strength of this approach is that it relies on human coding by reference to
a standardized and relatively uniform codebook (the thesaurus), an approach
often referred to as the “gold standard” in social science research.61 Human, as
opposed to computer-automated coding, allows for the judgment and context
necessary when parsing language.62 By contrast, alternative approaches such as
topic modeling, which attempts to classify the “topics” in a natural language corpus using algorithms,63 are widely considered second-best solutions to be used
when the resource costs required for human coding are prohibitive.64 To be sure,
humans can be strategic about the measure in ways that automated approaches
would not be. The OFR, however, generally reviews agency submissions, albeit
in an “advisory” manner and with a “light touch.”65 While the review does not
focus heavily on the subject list,66 the threat of oversight may nevertheless help
mitigate the possibility. The OFR and its agency liaisons, who are responsible
within the agency for Federal Register publications, are also repeat players.67

61.

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

chemicals; Hazardous substances; Natural resources; Superfund; Waste treatment and disposal.
See Paul DiMaggio, Adapting Computational Text Analysis to Social Science (and Vice Versa), BIG
DATA & SOC’Y, July-Dec. 2015, at 1, 2-3 (noting that “human reasoning is routinely described
as a ‘gold standard’ against which algorithmic output should be judged”); Laura K. Nelson et
al., The Future of Coding: A Comparison of Hand-Coding and Three Types of ComputerAssisted Text Analysis Methods 3 (Mar. 13, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with authors) (observing that “[m]ost social scientists continue to rely on traditional human coding
methods as the gold standard for the analysis of such phenomena”); see also Justin Grimmer
& Brandon M. Stewart, Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis
Methods for Political Texts, 21 POL. ANALYSIS 267, 268 (2013) (“[T]he complexity of language
implies that automated content analysis methods will never replace careful and close reading
of texts.”).
Grimmer & Stewart, supra note 61, at 270 (acknowledging that “all automated methods are
based on incorrect models of language” but that automation can usefully complement or supplement human coding).
For the seminal piece on this topic, see David M. Blei et al., Latent Dirichlet Allocation, 3 J.
MACHINE LEARNING RES. 993 (2003).
See sources cited supra note 61.
Bunk Interview, supra note 41; Swidal Interview, supra note 41.
Bunk Interview, supra note 41; see also Swidal Interview, supra note 41 (explaining the review
process).
See 2015 Federal Register Conference, OFF. FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/reader
-aids/office-of-the-federal-register-blog/2015/06/2015-federal-register-liaison-conference
[https://perma.cc/TWU6-MMPP] (“Each federal agency is required to designate an individual as a point of contact for all documents their agency publishes in the Federal Register.”).
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Agency failures to comply may therefore result in reputational sanctions and relational costs.68
Another critique may note that the measure could double count the number
of issues when officials list both “general” and “speciﬁc” terms.69 “Air transportation” and “air taxis” both appear in the thesaurus, for example, so a rule relating to air taxis could list both subjects. It is also possible that the thesaurus is not
speciﬁc enough in some areas, and that multiple “issues” could appear under one
general heading. Instead of double counting, it could be that the thesaurus is not
granular enough. We address some of these concerns in the Appendix by creating an “adjusted” measure that accounts for the presence of both speciﬁc and
general terms for a rule. We are able to do so based on the thesaurus itself, which
notates when terms may be more speciﬁc than others.70 Importantly, we ﬁnd that
none of our results change qualitatively with this adjusted measure.
Finally, yet another concern may be intercoder reliability—that is, the extent
to which independent coders at different agencies evaluate the content of interest
and reach the same conclusion. Ensuring consistency across dozens of agencies
with varying staff capacities is undoubtedly a difficult task.71 Mitigating these
concerns, however, is the fact that agency rule writers are provided coding guidance in a document-drafting handbook published by the OFR.72 The handbook
applies to all documents published in the Federal Register, including rules.73 The
handbook encourages rule writers to choose standardized terms based on the
CFR part designation.74 The handbook then directs readers to the thesaurus’s

68.

69.
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.

One test of the possibility of strategic listing of subjects would involve examining changes in
listing behavior around the time of sharp transitions in the oversight environment—conditional on a less manipulable (even if noisier) measure of the bundling content. We considered
such a test based on transitions of congressional control but concluded that the most plausible
alternative metric of bundling, sections of the Code of Federal Regulations touched by the
rule, though harder to manipulate, was too coarse to meaningfully account for dynamics in
rule content. Nevertheless, those results indicate few signs of strategic listing behavior, and
we make them available on request.
See Swidal Interview, supra note 41 (acknowledging the potential overlap between general and
speciﬁc terms).
E-mail from Brian Swidal, Senior Editor, Office of the Fed. Register, Nat’l Archives & Records
Admin., to Authors (May 2, 2018) (on ﬁle with authors).
See Swidal Interview, supra note 41 (describing different coding practices at different agencies).
Office of the Fed. Register, Document Drafting Handbook, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.archives.gov/ﬁles/federal-register/write/handbook/ddh.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SM42-7U4V].
Id.
Id. at 2-15, 3-20.
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website, which contains a link to the indexing terms associated with each CFR
part.75 In this manner, the guidance encourages interagency consistency by
providing a standardized list of terms as a starting point, based on how the regulation will eventually be codiﬁed.
***
As for the dataset of underlying rules, the entries derive from the Federal
Register between 2000 and 2017, amounting to almost twenty years of rulemaking data.76 Unless they provide actual notice or personal service on the potentially affected parties, agencies are legally required to publish their ﬁnal rules in
the Federal Register.77 Thus, these data are likely the most comprehensive look
possible at the universe of proposed and ﬁnal rulemakings. Earlier efforts to
study agency behavior, by contrast, have relied almost exclusively on Uniﬁed
Agenda entries to capture rulemaking behavior.78 Yet most scholars have

75.

Code of Federal Regulations List of Subjects, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., https://www
.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/subjects.html [https://perma.cc/4HST-QX93]; see also
Telephone Interview with Andrew Emery, President, Regulatory Grp. (Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Emery Interview] (explaining the process of listing subjects).
76. For a more detailed discussion of rulemaking data, see Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz,
Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2016). The Appendix also provides
further details.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018) (“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the
Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law.”).
78. See, e.g., Alex Acs & Charles M. Cameron, Does White House Regulatory Review Produce a
Chilling Effect and “OIRA Avoidance” in the Agencies?, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 443, 443
(2013); Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The Contours of Public Participation in Agency Rulemaking, 1 I/S 59, 70 (2005) (“[U]se of the Uniﬁed Agenda ensures that the
set of rulemakings under study represents as complete a snapshot as possible of [Department
of Transportation rulemaking activities].”); Steven J. Balla, Political Control, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Public Commenting on Agency Regulations, 93 PUB. ADMIN. 524, 536 n.12 (2014);
Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes to Develop
Rules, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 187, 206 n.5 (George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003); Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285, 319 (2013); Steven
J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA’s
Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 533 (1994); Stephen M. Johnson, Ossiﬁcation’s Demise?: An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL.
L. 767, 780-81 (2008); Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the
Midnight Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1441, 1454 (2005); Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’ Failure to Comply
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Periodic Review Requirement—and Current Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1199, 1215-19 (2006); Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations, 23
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acknowledged that these data are incomplete.79 Overall, our dataset includes approximately 19,000 proposed rules and 41,000 ﬁnal rules.80 In addition to the
listed subjects, we collect the full text of the proposed and ﬁnal rules, as well as
multiple other variables of interest, such as the identity of the issuing agency, the
date of publication, and the word count of the rule.
B. Alternate Measures
We also considered a number of alternative measures of bundling as a check
to our own: one based on the number of words in the regulatory document,81
and another based on the number of tie-ins to the regulatory code—that is, the
number of CFR parts or sections listed in a rule. Both measures have strengths,
but their limitations ultimately counsel in favor of the subject-based measure
used here. As for the ﬁrst alternative, one might be tempted to rely on the number of words in a regulation on the theory that more words imply more subjects
or issues addressed.82 After all, regulatory bundling reﬂects the discretion of
agencies to aggregate topics that could otherwise be addressed in separate rules.
But there are at least two problems with this approach. First, the number of
words may signal not several subjects, but the greater detail or complexity of a
single subject. Second, the number of required regulatory analyses has varied

79.

80.
81.
82.

J.L. & POL. 393, 400 (2007); Edward H. Stiglitz, Unaccountable Midnight Rulemaking?: A Normatively Informative Assessment, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 156 (2014); Jason Webb
Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rulemaking “Ossiﬁed”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261, 267-68 (2010); Jason Webb
Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Divided Government and U.S. Federal Rulemaking, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 128, 132 (2009); Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal
Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373,
379 (2012).
See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 33, at 198 n.41 (noting that his investigation into the quality of
the Uniﬁed Agenda data was “sufficiently disappointing that [he did] not pursue[] the analysis on a more ‘scientiﬁc’ basis”); O’Connell, supra note 31, at 927 n.108 (“[The] Uniﬁed
Agenda data are not perfect; they need conﬁrmatory research.”).
In earlier research, we ﬁnd that ﬁnal rules dramatically outnumber proposed rules. See Nou &
Stiglitz, supra note 76.
The rulemaking document contains both the proposal or ﬁnal rule and any preambulatory
materials.
Michael Simkovic & Miao Ben Zhang, Measuring Regulation 4-5 (June 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205589 (describing the use of word
counts in previous studies of rulemaking).
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across time in ways that are independent from the scope of a particular rule.83
The same is true of the stringency of judicial review.84 As a result, word counts
could vary because of exogenous analytic requirements rather than agency
choices about regulatory scope.
One might thus turn instead to a measure focused on the number of CFR
parts or sections listed in a rule. The CFR is organized into ﬁfty titles according
to broad subject-matter categories, such as Environment (Title 40), Labor (Title
29), and Transportation (Title 49). These titles are then organized into chapters,
parts, and sections.85 As relevant here, the chapter designation usually contains
the rules of the issuing agency and often bears the agency’s name.86 The part, in
turn, often contains rules regarding a single program or agency function. The
section, however, is “the basic unit of the CFR” and “typically contains one provision of program/function rules.”87 Thus, counting the number of CFR parts
or sections cited in a rule might give one a sense of the number of topics addressed in the rulemaking. The main problem with this approach, though, is the
lack of rationalization and organization of the CFR across agencies.88 Different
agencies have made different choices about how to codify their provisions, resulting in a nonstandardized unit of analysis.89 By contrast, the subject-based
measure is implemented through a standardized set of guidelines, as discussed
above.90
Despite these drawbacks, one would nonetheless expect positive correlations
between the number of subjects listed and these indicia. Indeed, all of these indicia correlate positively (albeit weakly) with the measure of bundling in our
dataset, suggesting its validity. The correlation between our measure and the log
83.

84.
85.

86.

87.

88.
89.
90.

See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400-36 (1992) (discussing analytic requirements imposed by courts, Congress, and the executive branch).
Id. at 1410-26.
Standard Organization of the Code of Federal Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2018); see also
Richard J. McKinney, A Research Guide to the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations,
LAW LIBR. SOC’Y WASH. D.C. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.llsdc.org/fr-cfr-research-guide
[https://perma.cc/5QUD-R6Y8] (showing the suborganization of the titles).
Daniel Stoehr, Understanding the Structure of the Code of Federal Regulations, DANIELS TRAINING
SERVS. INC. (Feb. 11, 2012), https://danielstraining.com/understanding-the-structure-of-the
-code-of-federal-regulations [https://perma.cc/5TKF-XT4G].
Federal Register Tutorial, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www
.archives.gov/federal-register/tutorial/online-html.html#CFR
[https://perma.cc/U2LB
-QSSH].
Bunk Interview, supra note 41.
Id.
See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
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number of CFR parts is 0.07, between the number of subparts is 0.17, and between the number of words in the rulemaking document is 0.26. There is a positive relationship between measures based on the Federal Register Thesaurus,
the number of words, and CFR parts and sections. For the sake of transparency,
especially for those concerned with the limitations of our measure, we present
the various empirical analyses below using the alternative approaches in the Appendix.
C. Trends
Let us return now to our subject-based measure. Administrative agencies appear to be increasingly bundling subjects in their rulemakings. As Figure 1 below
illustrates, the average number of subjects has been more or less steadily increasing during the last twenty years for both proposed (left panel) and ﬁnal rules
(right panel).91 Each dot represents the average number of subjects listed by
agencies in proposed or ﬁnal rules in a given month. The size of the dot is proportional to the number of proposed or ﬁnal rules issued in that month, while
the grey line shows the trend over time. The trend is more marked for proposed
rules. For the ﬁrst twenty-four months of our series, the average proposed rule
contained roughly 4.03 listed subjects; in the ﬁnal twenty-four months of our
series, it contained an average of approximately 4.8 listed subjects. While the
absolute magnitude (less than one subject over the time period) should not be
overstated, it does represent an increase of about nineteen percent, averaged
across thousands of rules. Around 2017, one sees a dip in bundling for proposed
rules, which may owe to features unique to the Trump Administration, such as
those involving personnel or the transition.92 The number of listed subjects in
ﬁnal rules has also increased, but more gradually. For ﬁnal rules, the average
number of listed subjects increased from about 4.4 in the opening twenty-four

91.

Speciﬁcally, we create monthly bins of rules and calculate the average number of subjects in
each bin. The left panel of the ﬁgure presents the results for proposed rules; the right panel,
ﬁnal rules. Within each panel, time runs on the x-axis and the indicated measure runs on the
y-axis. The vertical dashed lines represent shifts in administrations, each dot represents the
average for the relevant metric in a month, and the line shows the trends over time. The trend
line is produced using a locally weighted average of the months, so that at any point the line
represents the average proportion, with months closer to that point weighted more heavily
than months farther from that point.
92. Note that in the smoothed average the point of inﬂection occurs before 2017; it is at this earlier
point that the end of the series begins to inﬂuence the smoothed average. That point of inﬂection, however, is sensitive to the choice of smoothing parameter. The raw data, as revealed
in the points, suggest that an abrupt change occurred around 2017, that is, around the time of
the change in administrations.
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months to about 4.9 in the closing twenty-four months, an increase of about ten
percent.93
This observation could reﬂect a broader phenomenon: policy-making instruments across a variety of settings have become longer and more complex over
time. Both statutes and Supreme Court opinions, for example, reﬂect this dynamic.94 Speciﬁc explanations vary, but these phenomena likely reﬂect related
causes. For instance, the economic and social conditions that the law seeks to
regulate have become more interdependent and uncertain over time.95 At the
same time, the costs of storing, searching, and retrieving legal knowledge have
decreased as consumers of the law—from lawyers to judges to the public—now
have greater access to sophisticated legal technology, further encouraging
lengthy and complex legal documents.96 For these reasons, legal instruments as
a whole often address more subjects.

93.

An interesting feature of these trends is that we do not observe a corresponding dip in bundling for ﬁnal rules around 2017. One interpretation of this pattern is that new proposed rules
exhibit more sensitivity to transitions in administration than ﬁnal rules. For instance, ﬁnal
rules may have momentum behind them, with inﬂuential stakeholders largely in agreement
with the content of the rule.
94. See, e.g., Michael J. Bommarito II & Daniel M. Katz, A Mathematical Approach to the Study of
the United States Code, 389 PHYSICA A 4195, 4195 (2010) (ﬁnding that the “Code has grown in
its amount of structure, interdependence and language”); Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on
Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11
/18/us/18rulings.html [https://perma.cc/UTW5-B293] (reporting that the “number of
words per decision has been climbing”).
95. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1,
25 (1992).
96. Id.
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FIGURE 1.
BUNDLING ACTIVITY TRENDS: 2000-17

Administrative agencies may likewise engage in more bundling due to a
number of related developments in the regulatory state. A new rule today is likely
to touch on several existing rules or implicate a number of overlapping statutes.97
New regulations are written against the backdrop of an increasing store of existing legal obligations, requiring more topics to be addressed for seemingly simple
changes. This contrasts with the earlier days of the administrative state, when
agencies developed novel regulatory programs in more clearly delineated ﬁelds.
Congress, too, has increasingly delegated policy issues to multiple agencies,
compelling agencies to write joint rules dealing with a greater number of topics.98 As more agencies become involved, they may spot a greater number of issues implicated. The increase may also be explained as a behavioral reaction to
97.

See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 863 (2006) (noting that
with regulatory “growth has come a concomitant increase in the engagement of regulatory
institutions across jurisdictional lines”).
98. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012).
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political and judicial oversight or greater litigation threats from those involved
in the public-comment process. Perhaps bundling has become the favored strategy for overwhelming resource-constrained opponents.
To shed some light on these various dynamics, note that some agencies bundle more than others. Speciﬁcally, Figure 2 below shows that several agencies—
such as EPA, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—issue a larger number of bundled
rules on average.99 By contrast, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Commerce tend not to issue proposed or ﬁnal rules with many listed subjects; on
average, they list fewer than two subjects per proposed or ﬁnal rule. This interagency variation may reﬂect many differences worthy of further exploration.
EPA and HUD, for example, operate under different enabling statutes that
may address many more issues than a narrower-mission agency like DOD. They
may therefore have the ability to bundle in ways that DOD does not. In other
words, Congress itself may constrain agency bundling decisions when it makes
choices about agency jurisdiction as well as statutory scope.100 Alternatively,
EPA, HUD, and the VA may also be more heavily monitored, thus inducing more
bundling in attempts to divide and distract the attention of resource-constrained
interest groups or to placate the various stakeholders in play. These agencies, as
a group, receive more public attention than, say, the General Services Administration (GSA). In addition, the trends may also reﬂect changes in underlying
rulemaking behavior outside of bundling and splitting incentives. Put differently, there may be differences in the composition of underlying rules that are
difficult to isolate but important to recognize.101
99.

For the full list of agency abbreviations, see infra pp.1235-37.
See also Telephone Interview with Nada Culver, Senior Counsel & Senior Dir., The Wilderness
Soc’y (Oct. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Culver Interview] (making a similar observation).
101. Suppose, for instance, that the VA issued few rules at the start of the series and many in the
end of the series. Overall, this would produce an upward trend in bundling over time, but
possibly due solely to the greater activity of the VA. To account for this, one can decompose
the increase into compositional and secular factors. In particular, one can remove compositional changes, as in the VA example, by ﬁxing the composition at the values of the ﬁrst year
in the series. Say, for instance, that the VA issued 5% of the rules in 2000. Then, going forward, we weight the average subjects listed by the VA as though the VA issued 5% of the rules
in later periods, even if in fact the VA issued 10% or 15% of the rules in those periods. This
resembles the approach taken, for example, in Olivier Bargain & Tim Callan, Analyzing the
Effects of Tax-Beneﬁt Reforms on Income Distribution: A Decomposition Approach, 8 J. ECON. INEQ.
1 (2010); and Olivier Bargain et al., Tax Policy and Income Inequality in the U.S., 1979-2007: A
Decomposition Approach, 53 ECON. INQUIRY 1061 (2015).
This analysis suggests that about half of the increase is due to compositional changes. For
instance, as reported above, the number of subjects increased by about 19% between the ﬁrst
twenty-four and the last twenty-four months of the series. With the composition ﬁxed, the
100.
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FIGURE 2.
BUNDLING AT THE AGENCY LEVEL

Less substantively, it is also possible that there are simply coding discrepancies across administrative agencies. Perhaps coding practices at the VA differ systematically from those at the Farm Credit Administration. Finally, the drafters
of the thesaurus may also have split subject areas in ways that are reﬂected in the
results but do not necessarily correspond to behavioral choices made by particular agencies.

increase reduces to about 11% for notices of proposed rulemaking. Along the same lines, for
ﬁnal rules, the unadjusted increase between the ﬁrst and last twenty-four months is about
10%. With the agency composition ﬁxed, the increase is only about 5% using the same periods
of comparison. The problem with this approach, however, is that these compositional changes
are themselves endogenous to the bundling and splitting dynamics we examine. Isolating
them is thus not a straightforward task.
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More generally, the bundling behavior of an agency is broadly similar for
proposed and ﬁnal rules. If an agency tends to bundle in proposed rules, then it
also tends to do so for ﬁnal rules. Across agencies, the correlation between the
number of listed subjects in proposed and ﬁnal rules is 0.84. Figure 3 below plots
the average number of subjects for ﬁnal rules against the average number of subjects for proposed rules. The dashed line on a forty-ﬁve-degree angle represents
the line of perfect correspondence, such that an agency that falls on the line has
the same number of subjects in its proposed and ﬁnal rules. Agencies above the
line tend to have more subjects in ﬁnal than proposed rules, and agencies below
the line tend to have fewer subjects in ﬁnal than proposed rules. We later examine how the number of subjects evolves within a rulemaking effort from proposed to ﬁnal rule.
FIGURE 3
BUNDLING IN PROPOSED AND FINAL RULES, BY AGENCY

1197

the yale law journal

128:1174

2019

ii. bundlers and splitters
In light of this initial snapshot, this Part considers in more detail the incentives agencies have to bundle and split rules at a given point in time. The ﬁrst
Section examines factors inﬂuencing the agency’s decision-making independent
of external oversight, while the second Section introduces the dynamics created
by political and judicial monitors. These dimensions, of course, are linked,102 but
considering each in isolation is useful.
A. Internal Regulatory Drafters
1. Intra-agency Bargaining
Like legislatures drafting statutes, agencies drafting rules require the agreement of multiple internal actors. This dynamic is especially true in multimember
commissions, which normally require a majority vote to approve a rule.103 But
even in single-headed agencies, regulatory drafting involves many internal constituencies with conﬂicting points of view.104 Career staff in the relevant program
office approach the rule with their subject-matter expertise.105 Lawyers from the
general counsel’s office bring their legal perspectives.106 Policy analysts or economists may press cost-beneﬁt or other decision-making frameworks.107 All are
102.

103.

104.

105.

106.
107.

Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation
of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 426 (2009) (describing “internal separation of powers mechanisms” and arguing that separation-of-powers doctrines have failed to “directly connect internal and external constraints”).
See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, Voting Behavior on the FCC, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 587 (1969)
(discussing the voting patterns and partisan affiliations of commissioners on the Federal
Communications Commission).
See WESLEY A. MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY
AGENCY BEHAVIOR 74 (1986) (describing “[c]onﬂict between the drafters of the rule and the
economic analysis group” within a given rulemaking agency); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1072 (2011) (discussing how
“[a]gency structure and required processes . . . allocate authority within the agency . . . to experts in the ‘middle’ of the agency . . . [or] to political appointees at the top of the
agency . . . [or] to agency personnel at the bottom of the agency”).
See, e.g., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION
RULEMAKING MANUAL
7 (2000), http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/ﬁles/docs
/FHWARulemaking%20Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMF6-3CCA] [hereinafter FHWA
MANUAL] (identifying the “program office” as the “technical office responsible for . . . [d]rafting rulemaking documents”).
Magill & Vermeule, supra note 104, at 1061.
Id. at 1051.
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usually involved in the ﬁrst stages of regulatory drafting, during which they will
determine the initial scope of the regulation. These rule-writing teams typically
decide which provisions the regulations should contain as a preliminary matter.
Of course, agency management can also determine the initial scope of a rule
when composing these teams in the ﬁrst place.108
Regulatory bundling facilitates negotiations between these different internal
groups. Say a policy analyst determines that a regulation dealing with issue A
interferes with her objectives on some other issue B. The program officer who is
coordinating the rule may offer to include provisions relating to issue B to secure
the cooperation of the policy analyst. This scenario would result in an increase
in bundling due to internal politicking at the agency. Alternatively, a lawyer may
conclude that a particular part of the rule is subject to a statutory deadline and
therefore must be expedited. She might thus convince the team to split off that
piece from the rest of the rule, which has a slower timetable. This give-and-take
will likely continue until a consensus has been reached.
From there, the draft rule will then undergo an agency-speciﬁc clearance
procedure involving review by others in the agency, as well as up the hierarchy
to political appointees.109 At this point, many other offices are likely to be involved. Rule drafters within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must secure
the approval of a branch reviewer; the Associate, Deputy, and Chief Counsels;
the Assistant to the Commissioner; and, ﬁnally, the Commissioner before moving on to the Treasury Department for ﬁnal authorization.110 The Federal Highway Administration requires concurrence from the Agency’s other program ofﬁces, then its legal division, its Legislation and Regulations Division, and, ﬁnally,
the Agency’s Chief Counsel.111 Generally speaking, those in these clearance
chains do not possess hard internal vetoes in the sense that they can unilaterally
stop the rulemaking from proceeding.112 However, they can delay the draft rules
by raising objections during the sign-off process.113

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

113.

See Emery Interview, supra note 75.
See Jennifer Nou, Intra-agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 468 (2015) (discussing
internal clearance procedures).
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.6.8.4 (2018), http://
www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-006.html [https://perma.cc/WWH3-2RU6].
See FHWA MANUAL, supra note 105, at 8.
See Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Inﬂuence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 94 (2014) (“[O]ne government office ordinarily cannot authoritatively
stop the issuance of a document by its sibling office.”).
Id. (“[I]t is possible to give an office assigned a clearance role something very close to that
power, by structuring the conﬂict resolution procedure so that it is the operational office that
needs to ‘appeal’ a clearance denial.”).
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As a result, rule-writing teams may bundle or split rules to mollify the actual
or anticipated resistance faced within the agency. If a team within the IRS, for
example, expects that a speciﬁc provision will ultimately be rejected by a newly
appointed Chief Counsel, it can split off that provision for a future rulemaking—
perhaps when a more sympathetic Chief Counsel has been appointed. Splitting
controversial provisions can help ensure that regulatory efforts are not sunk by
skittish agency heads.114 At the same time, drafters may also bundle a large number of regulatory provisions together in the hopes that more controversial provisions ﬂy under the radar. In other words, bundling can allow what amount to
regulatory riders: provisions that are only tenuously related to the rule, but nevertheless attached in order to facilitate passage.115
Should disagreements regarding rule writing amongst these offices nevertheless persist, clearance procedures also specify how these issues should be elevated up the agency hierarchy and which higher-level policy official should ultimately resolve the dispute.116 At EPA, for instance, the Deputy Administrator
has been designated to adjudicate these disagreements,117 though she may elevate the most controversial issues to the Administrator.118 By comparison, the
Commissioner of the IRS speciﬁes that the Associate Chief Counsel within a division should usually resolve the dispute, though the matter could also be elevated to higher levels when necessary.119 Indeed, in most agencies, the ultimate

114.
115.
116.

117.

118.

119.

See Emery Interview, supra note 75.
Id.
The FHWA Manual, for instance, explicitly states that the rulemaking team is responsible for
“resolv[ing] issues or elevat[ing] issues to management for resolution.” FHWA MANUAL,
supra note 105, at 8. Similarly, EPA provides that “[i]f workgroup members cannot agree, the
issues of disagreement should be presented to management for resolution.” EPA’s Action Development Process: Guidance for EPA Staff on Developing Quality Actions, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY 34 (2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab%5CSABPRODUCT.NSF/5088B3878A90053
E8525788E005EC8D8/$File/adp03-00-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z3X-TCD7] [hereinafter
EPA’s Action Development Process]; see id. at 71 (discussing the process of informal and formal
elevation of disagreements to management and other policy officials such as the Administrator).
See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 57 (1975)
(“By the nature of the way EPA is (dis)organized, really sticky issues are escalated at least to
the [Deputy Assistant Administrator] level and maybe higher for resolution.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Memorandum from a Senior EPA Official to William F. Pedersen, Jr., Attorney, Envtl. Prot. Agency (May 4, 1975))).
See EPA’s Action Development Process, supra note 116, at 71 (noting that issues could ultimately be formally elevated to the Administrator, though doing so would be “unusual” except
for the most signiﬁcant rules).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 110, § 32.1.6.3.
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authority to bundle or split a rule lies with the statutorily designated political
appointee, usually the head of the agency.
The dynamics become even more complicated when there are several agency
heads involved—as in joint rulemakings or on multimember boards and commissions like the Securities and Exchange Commission or the National Labor
Relations Board.120 Individual commissioners and board members for a given
agency often arrive in staggered terms, appointed by different Presidents, and
sometimes as a result of party-balancing requirements.121 They approach their
jobs from different backgrounds, career experiences, and priorities.122 Consequently, these agency heads often desire different regulatory outcomes, even
when they are nominally members of the same political party.123 In such situations, they can strike compromises through bundled rules by exchanging certain
favored provisions for less favored ones.124 This strategy becomes particularly
attractive when the agency is unlikely to engage in further rulemaking on a particular topic because of political constraints. Under these circumstances, there is
more pressure to resolve disagreements within the context of a single rule.
In this manner, regulatory bundling may be explained by internal negotiations within an agency drafting the rule. Diverse agency constituencies, including programmatic career staff, policy analysts, and lawyers can engage in bargaining when deciding the scope of a rule. These negotiations then can extend
across agency offices as the rule undergoes a horizontal review process. From
there, any remaining disagreements will be elevated up to political appointees
who may further decide to add or split the subjects addressed in the rulemaking.

120.

121.

122.
123.
124.

See generally MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED
STATES: LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS (2015) (discussing the complex dynamics of multimember independent agencies).
See Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 14
(2018) (describing “the effect of [partisan balance requirements] on the ideological composition of multimember Agencies”); Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of
Statutory Partisan Requirements on Regulation 1-3 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n Annual Meetings,
Working Paper No. 73, 2007), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2219
&context=alea [https://perma.cc/FX3F-AYU3] (discussing the debate over statutory partisan
requirements for regulatory commissions).
See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 120, at 96.
See Sharon B. Jacobs, Administrative Dissents, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 572-75 (2017).
See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2000) (noting that independent
agencies “are also multi-member organizations, a fact that tends toward accommodation of
diverse or extreme views through the compromise inherent in the process of collegial decisionmaking”).
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When there are multiple agency heads, regulatory bundling allows for logrolling
and negotiation to occur before rules are subject to a vote.
2. Rule-Production Costs
Beyond internal agency compromises, the production costs of regulatory
drafting may affect bundling behavior as well. In thinking about the resource
burdens of writing a rule, it is helpful to distinguish between the ﬁxed, variable,
and marginal costs. A ﬁxed cost is any cost that does not vary with the number
of subjects addressed in a rule.125 For instance, agencies that decide to engage in
rulemaking must establish a docket,126 secure boilerplate templates, and draft
other standardized language necessary to conform to the Federal Register Document Drafting Handbook.127 In addition, most agencies require internal management-related paperwork from rule-writing offices seeking permission to
begin regulatory drafting.128 These documents often require an abstract of the
contemplated regulation and supporting justiﬁcation.129
The presence of ﬁxed production costs generally encourages regulatory bundling. Bundling allows agencies to address more issues while paying the ﬁxed
costs only once. That is, bundling allows for greater administrative efficiency.
Splitting the issues into separate rulemakings, by contrast, requires the agency
to pay the ﬁxed costs repeatedly.130 Holding all else equal, one would thus expect
to see more bundling occur when the ﬁxed costs of producing a rule increase.
One would also expect the same result when an agency suffers budget cuts. Conversely, when ﬁxed costs fall, agencies may be more inclined to split provisions
into separate rules. A variable cost, by contrast, is one that varies with the num-

125.

126.
127.
128.

129.
130.

There are some ﬁxed costs that agencies must absorb even if they decide not to write any rules.
These include, for example, rule-writing staff salaries and other normal agency operating
costs. However, these costs would seem to go to the question of how many rules an agency
produces, not the scope of those rules.
About EPA Dockets, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/dockets/about-epa
-dockets#docket [https://perma.cc/4EK8-D67N].
Emery Interview, supra note 75.
Id.; see, e.g., EPA’s Action Development Process, supra note 116, at 14 (“Prior to initiating substantive development activities, the lead office prepares and submits a tiering form describing
the new action.”).
See Emery Interview, supra note 75.
Some of these ﬁxed costs may be mitigated by the use of templates and standardized language.
Such measures, however, still require staff members to use their time and expertise to exercise
the necessary discretion when tailoring the templates.
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ber of subjects addressed by a rule. Generally speaking, the more issues addressed in a regulation, the costlier the rule-drafting effort. Some obvious variable costs include the resources necessary for researching additional technical issues or preparing the necessary analytical documents associated with more
issues. In addition, there are also greater publication costs in the Federal Register, which currently charges a per-page rate.131
Relatedly, marginal costs reﬂect the costs of adding an incremental subject
to a rule. Marginal costs may be either increasing or decreasing. When they are
increasing, each additional issue is costlier than the last; when they are decreasing, each additional issue, though still costly, is less costly than the previous one.
Therefore, increasing marginal costs would tend to discourage agencies from issuing rules that touch on many subjects, while decreasing marginal costs offer
economies of scale and thus encourage bundling. There are good reasons to believe that the marginal costs of regulatory drafting decrease at some point,
though they are likely generally increasing given inevitable resource constraints.
They may decrease, that is, when a rule-writing team gains the requisite expertise necessary to regulate (or deregulate) in a particular domain. Once a baseline
level of knowledge has been obtained, the marginal subject addressed can be
cheaper to resolve. However, at some other point, the team’s resources may present a bottleneck, and the marginal costs would begin to increase sharply. Each
additional issue the team must address becomes increasingly expensive as the
rule writers are required to work overtime or are taken away from other higherpriority matters. Because bundled regulations simultaneously strain agency resources, this form of congestion can be challenging for agencies to accommodate
and can lead to staffing shortages. In response, agencies may smooth out their
workﬂows by partitioning the issues across separate rules.132
B. Monitors
While intra-agency dynamics can help to explain the scope of a rule, external
monitors such as the President, Congress, and the courts also likely play an important role. These monitors can effectively veto rules, leading agencies to draft
rules in their shadow. Put differently, strategic agencies can respond to the incentives created by executive, congressional, and judicial review. The ﬁrst Sec-

131.

Circular Letter No. 1003, GOV’T PUB. OFF. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.gpo.gov/docs/default
-source/circular-letters-pdf-ﬁles/2018/cir1003.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG6G-2CDG] (lowering per-page Federal Register publication rates).
132. See Telephone Interview with Brenda Mallory & Marna McDermott, Conservation Litig. Project (Sept. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Mallory & McDermott Interview] (describing this phenomenon).
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tion thus explores when and why agencies may bundle or split rules when confronted with oversight generally. The second Section then examines the more
particular dynamics presented by executive, legislative, and judicial monitors. It
also addresses the ways in which these overseers can bundle and split rules unilaterally and the mechanisms they use to do so.
1. Facing Oversight
When confronted with a monitor that can reverse its policy decision, a strategic agency faces a set of trade-offs in deciding whether to bundle or split the
regulatory provisions it seeks to promulgate. Say an agency can either pack ten
regulatory provisions into one rulemaking or split them into ten separate rulemakings. What informs this choice when it comes to thwarting external review?
Would a strategic agency prefer to bundle or split its rules?
Much of the answer depends on the structure of monitoring costs—how
overseers must invest resources to observe an agency’s rulemaking efforts before
deciding to intervene.133 These monitors could include political monitors, such
as the President or Congress, and judicial monitors, as well as interest groups
and members of the public serving as “ﬁre alarms.”134 It is helpful, once again,
to refer to ﬁxed and marginal costs, here applied to the monitoring of a given
rulemaking effort. Fixed monitoring costs are those that do not vary with the
scope of a rule—for example, a ﬂat fee just to access each Federal Register entry.
Marginal monitoring costs are the costs associated with evaluating the incremental subject in a rule.
As an independent matter, when ﬁxed monitoring costs are positive and material, splitting rules is likely to be more effective than bundling in thwarting
oversight. Ten separate rules will deplete a greater number of monitoring resources than one bundled rule since monitors will have to incur set costs to evaluate each rule. So, as ﬁxed monitoring costs increase, a strategic agency would
often do better to split provisions across rules to drain the resources of their overseers, thus reducing oversight and opposition. At the same time, large ﬁxed costs
could also induce the monitor to adopt an auditing strategy, not unlike what

133.

See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 34, at 1170-72 (emphasizing the relationship between
agency behavior and monitoring costs).
134. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 264-71 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L.
REV. 431, 444 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
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OIRA does when ﬂagging economically signiﬁcant rules.135 How an agency
would adapt to these auditing strategies would depend on the auditing criteria
as well as the number of monitors it faces. The more monitors and criteria, the
more difficult it may be for the agency to adopt a consistent response strategy.
Marginal monitoring costs invite different considerations. If the marginal
costs of monitoring issues are increasing, then strategic agencies may be able to
overwhelm overseers more effectively by bundling rather than splitting. Marginal costs may be increasing due to information-processing constraints—the
limited resources and attention necessary to make high-quality decisions.136
Bundling makes it more expensive for monitors to review because each additional subject in a rule is increasingly costly to evaluate, which may lead resourceconstrained agencies to skim over some provisions. As a result, the most contentious provisions are likely to gain more attention, thus allowing less contentious
ones to ﬂy under the radar. In this scenario, bundling can serve to insulate some
issues from review and reversal. Thus, under increasing marginal costs, one
would expect agencies to engage in more bundling. Conversely, with decreasing
marginal costs, one would expect less bundling.
In short, the ﬁxed and marginal costs can result in cross-cutting incentives
for agencies. Some of these incentives are themselves dependent on the number
of monitors agencies face as well as their salience, and on the possible auditing
strategies that monitors might adopt. It is thus ambiguous as a matter of theory
whether a strategic agency will be more likely to bundle or split when facing
adverse oversight. The question must be resolved empirically and with attention
to the possible heterogeneous effects across types of rules.
2. Political and Judicial Review
Agencies face slightly different incentives for how to structure their rules
when confronted with review by the President, Congress, or the courts. Their
ultimate bundling decisions may vary depending on which overseer they are
likely to face most often. To explore these dynamics, this Section focuses more
speciﬁcally on various monitors in the administrative state: the incentives they
create as well as their ability, if any, to bundle and split agency rules themselves.
It is important to acknowledge that interest groups and the general public are
135.

Monitors from smaller organizations with fewer resources may also adapt by forging relationships with larger-scale monitors who may be better positioned to identify rules of mutual
interest. See Mallory & McDermott Interview, supra note 132. Alternatively, resource-constrained monitors may rely on trade presses and newsletters or more informal contacts within
agencies with better access to information about agency activities. Id.; see also Culver Interview, supra note 100.
136. See BERTRAM MYRON GROSS, THE MANAGING OF ORGANIZATIONS 857 (1964).
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also important monitors. Their inﬂuence, however, largely operates through the
monitors discussed below.
a. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
The President’s principal regulatory check operates through a centralized
process coordinated by OIRA.137 A bipartisan series of presidents have by executive order required executive agencies to submit proposed and ﬁnal rules to
OIRA for review.138 In particular, these agencies must submit “signiﬁcant” rules,
including those deemed “economically signiﬁcant,” that is, those expected to
cost $100 million or more annually.139 Economically signiﬁcant rules are more
likely to be publicly salient, heightening the risk of presidential reversal.140 Agencies seeking to avoid that outcome would beneﬁt from splitting costly rules into
parts, each of which falls beneath the $100 million threshold.141 So, for example,
an economically signiﬁcant rule with an expected impact of $150 million in a
given year could be split into two separate rules, each of which is expected to cost

137.

138.

139.

140.

141.

See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1261, 1264 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2013).
More precisely, any agency that is not a statutorily-deﬁned “independent regulatory agency”
must submit regulatory actions to OIRA for review. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3
C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994) (deﬁning “agency” using 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) and excluding those
agencies speciﬁed in § 3502(10), which has since been recodiﬁed at § 3502(5)).
Id. § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 645. To be signiﬁcant, a regulatory action must meet at least one
of four sets of ﬂexible criteria: it might raise potential inconsistencies with other agencies,
“materially alter the budgetary impact of” certain programs, invoke “novel legal or policy issues,” or be economically signiﬁcant.
Public logs also reveal that such rules are more likely to become the subject of meetings
between OIRA staff and interested parties, suggesting heightened public scrutiny as well.
See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 844, 871-72 (2003).
See Declaration of Richard B. Belzer at 9, Tafas v. Dudas, 530 F. Supp. 2d 786 (E.D. Va. 2008)
(No. 1:07-cv-00846-JCC-TRJ), http://www.rbbelzer.com/uploads/7/1/7/4/7174353/tafas
_ex-21-belzer-declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY5T-4YTD] (“During my tenure in OIRA,
I often observed agencies attempt to split draft regulations into smaller parts so as to avoid
exceeding the $100 million threshold for a ‘major’ or ‘economically signiﬁcant’ regulation,
presumably in hopes of avoiding the requirements to prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis.”); Note, supra note 6, at 1002; Donald R. Arbuckle, OIRA and Presidential Regulatory Review 15 (May 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), https://works.bepress.com
/donald_arbuckle/1 [https://perma.cc/684K-6378] (observing that agency officials often “divided potential major rules into two or more non-major components, and in other cases they
might argue that the estimated costs or beneﬁts were under the $100 million threshold”).
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$75 million in that year. Individually, neither of these rules would be designated
as economically signiﬁcant, thus effectively lowering the scrutiny of executive
oversight.
A strategic agency could also bundle a rule with high beneﬁts and low costs
with other rules it wishes to pursue that, standing alone, would not meet a costbeneﬁt criterion. Say, for example, that a regulation dealing with reporting requirements promises $1 million in beneﬁts, but at a cost of $5 million—it would
not, on its own, be cost-beneﬁt justiﬁed. However, say the agency is also considering another regulation restricting air pollution that would yield $100 million
in beneﬁts and only $50 million in costs. Combining these two rules would result
in a regulation with $101 million in beneﬁts and $55 million in costs, now passing
a cost-beneﬁt test. Regulatory-impact analysis also reveals the distributional effects of rules.142 Thus, agencies facing public criticism from certain groups can
split proposed rules before ﬁnalizing them in order to favor speciﬁc populations.143
The similar thresholds and criteria set by the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act (UMRA) reinforce all of these incentives.144 UMRA directs agencies to assess
regulatory impacts on state, local, and tribal governments as well as the private
sector.145 In particular, agencies must draft cost-beneﬁt analyses for rules expected to cost $100 million or more in any one year (and adjusted annually for
inﬂation).146 The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is charged
with compiling those analyses and forwarding them to the Congressional
Budget Office.147 While monitoring by OIRA and Congress appears to be superﬁcial, agencies seeking to avoid associated litigation risk have an increased incentive to split the rule into parts that fall below the UMRA threshold.148
142.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Circular A-4 was issued by the Office of Management and Budget in 2003 to provide “guidance to Federal agencies on the development of regulatory analysis.” It states that “regulatory
analysis should provide a separate description of distributional effects (i.e., how both beneﬁts
and costs are distributed among subpopulations of particular concern) so that decision makers can properly consider them along with the effects on economic efficiency.” See Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT 1, 14 (Sept.
17, 2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/ﬁles/omb/circulars/A4/a-4
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D74-ATL6].
Emery Interview, supra note 75.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 tit. II, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1538 (2018).
Id. § 1531.
Id. § 1532.
Id. § 1536.
See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 105 (2015)
(observing that “OIRA lacks the power to block rules where the agency avoided the UMRA”
and that “[a]gencies that run afoul of OIRA risk only a negative report to Congress”).
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For its part, OIRA has attempted to counter such strategic behavior by rebundling these rules into one rule now categorized as economically signiﬁcant.
In fact, according to a former OIRA branch chief, OIRA once had an informal
agreement with EPA that the Agency would submit for review rules that cost
over $25 million per year.149 The idea was to deter EPA from tactical splitting to
avoid the $100 million threshold. More recently, OIRA has issued similarly sensitive guidance addressing President Trump’s two-for-one executive order, Executive Order 13,771.150 In particular, the guidance warns agencies not to “artiﬁcially bundl[e] provisions that are not logically connected in a single regulatory
action.”151 OIRA acknowledges that agencies may very well have good reasons
to package both regulatory and deregulatory provisions into one rulemaking,
but OIRA also warns that it may ask agencies to split the rules into separate regulatory and deregulatory provisions absent any discernible rationale.152
To begin to assess whether those agencies subject to OIRA review behave
differently from those that are not, Table 1 below considers a more general set of
political features and their relationship with bundling in proposed and ﬁnal
rules. For now, consider the ﬁrst line of the table, which indicates that executive
agencies include about 4.8 subjects in ﬁnal rules, and that independent agencies
include about 3.8 subjects—a difference of about one unit, which is statistically
signiﬁcant at any conventional level. This suggests that some aspect of executive
agencies’ statutory portfolio or oversight environment —most plausibly OIRA
review—induces them to bundle more often. The same basic pattern exists for
proposed rules, as shown in the bottom panel of the table.

149.

See Nou, supra note 6, at 1814 n.328.
See Memorandum from Dominic J. Mancini, Acting Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Regulatory Policy Officers at Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies & Managing & Exec. Dirs. of
Certain Agencies & Commc’ns (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse
.gov/ﬁles/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf [https://perma.cc/67TQ-WSPT].
151. Id. at 15.
152. Id.
150.

1208

regulatory bundling
TABLE 1.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND BUNDLING BEHAVIOR

Final
Rules

Political Feature

No

Yes

Difference

Executive Agency
Election Year
Presidential Election Year
Republican President
Divided Government

3.78
4.72
4.7
4.77
4.59

4.76
4.64
4.63
4.59
4.74

−0.99**
−0.07*
−0.07
−0.19**
−0.15**

Executive Agency

3.36

4.58

−1.21**

4.44

4.45

−0.01

4.46

4.41

−0.05

4.76

4.14

−0.62**

4.30

4.54

−0.25**

Election Year
Proposed
Presidential Election Year
Rules
Republican President
Divided Government

Note. ** Denotes a p-value of less than 0.01; * denotes a p-value of less than 0.05.

b. Congress
Congress’s main opportunity to veto a regulation arises in the form of the
Congressional Review Act (CRA).153 The Act requires agencies to submit their
ﬁnal rules to both houses of Congress and to the Comptroller General.154 In turn,
both houses can pass a fast-tracked joint resolution of disapproval that if signed
by the President—or passed by two-thirds of both houses over a presidential
veto—nulliﬁes the regulation under review.155 The tool has recently been revived
by the Trump Administration, after a relatively dormant period in which it operated more as a “soft veto,” exercised through threats.156 Importantly for our

153.

5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2018). Congress, of course, has many other tools at its disposal, including appropriations riders and the like. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 69, 84 (2006). Appropriations riders, in particular, may likewise serve
many of the functions of a veto, see id. at 69, and deserve further attention in future research.
154. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A). More speciﬁcally, agencies must submit a report that contains the
rule, a concise general statement describing the rule, and the rule’s proposed effective date.
Id.
155. Id. § 801(a)(3)(B), (b)(1).
156. See Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Beneﬁt Interpretation of the “Substantially Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word (Ergonomics)
Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 728 (2011). Until recently, the CRA had only been used once—
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purposes, the prescribed text157 of the joint resolution suggests that Congress
can only veto entire rules, not just component parts—a reading supported by the
legislative history.158 Furthermore, the resolution’s procedure prohibits any
amendments, and the ﬁnal vote is up or down, foreclosing the possibility that
the rule could be split on the ﬂoor.159 At the same time, legislators are unable to
bundle multiple rules into the same joint resolution of disapproval, so promulgated rules must be considered separately.160 As a result, Congress can only veto
rules in their entirety.
On the one hand, holding ﬁxed compliance costs constant,161 agencies have
an incentive to split rules under the CRA in order to decrease the risk that Congress will nullify provisions packaged together with the offending provision. In
other words, Congress may only dislike one provision in a rule, but nevertheless
feel compelled to overturn the entire bundled rule given the constraints of the
CRA. Agencies could thus seek to save those vulnerable provisions by cabining
them in a separate rulemaking. On the other hand, agencies may also want to
bundle a number of provisions in order to heighten the consequences of the
CRA’s all-or-nothing requirement. By packaging highly favorable provisions
into a rule, an agency could make it less likely for Congress to strike the rule

157.

158.

159.
160.

to overturn the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s ergonomics standard in
March 2001. See MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30116, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE 6 (2008); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening
the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 190 (2018) (noting that the CRA
has been used under the Trump Administration to veto ﬁfteen regulations from the last year
of the Obama Presidency alone).
5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (“‘That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the _____ relating to
_____, and such rule shall have no force or effect.’ (The blank spaces being appropriately
ﬁlled in).”).
See Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking?: A
Brief Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (1999) (concluding that “the statutory structure and legislative history of the review provision strongly
indicates that Congress intended the process to focus on submitted rules as a whole, and not
to allow veto of individual parts”).
Id. at 1065.
See Larkin, supra note 156, at 251 (noting proposed legislative amendments “allowing Congress to bundle more than one rule into a joint resolution of disapproval rather than consider
them one at a time”).

.

161
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For example, all agencies submitting rules under the CRA must prepare the same standardized form with an attachment, as appropriate, providing a concise statement of the rule. See
Submission of Federal Rules Under the Congressional Review Act (Mar. 23, 1999), https://www
.gao.gov/decisions/majrule/FED_RULE.PDF [https://perma.cc/TX7A-FRKB].
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down at all—especially since the CRA does not allow agencies to promulgate any
substantially similar rules once nulliﬁed.162
To explore the possibility that disagreement between the branches might affect bundling behavior, turn again to Table 1. One would generally expect the
most pronounced effect of the CRA to occur during times of divided government, when one party controls at least one house of Congress and the other party
controls the Presidency. However, divided government does not seem to inﬂuence greatly the extent of bundling. For ﬁnal rules, the number of subjects is
about the same regardless of divided government, increasing by about 0.15 units
during divided government; for notices, the number of subjects is greater during
times of divided government, but likewise only modestly so, increasing by about
0.25 units. This pattern suggests that conﬂict with Congress at most modestly
increases bundling by agency officials—owing to the CRA or other congressional
tools.
To examine the CRA’s bundling effects more closely, consider that the CRA
is most effective during transitions to uniﬁed government after the White House
changes parties. By its own terms, the CRA has limited reach—the fast-track
procedures are available for only sixty days after Congress receives the rule.163
This means that Congress can reach only into recent regulatory history and is
barred from attacking regulations issued even several months earlier. It may be
in this narrow window only—when Congress and the President both oppose
regulations recently issued by a President of the opposing party—that one is
most likely to ﬁnd effective congressional opposition.
The rules most likely to be subject to these effects, therefore, are those issued
in the ﬁnal months of a presidential administration, particularly the “midnight”
period after the presidential election but before the inauguration of the next
President, especially one from the opposing party.164 However, as reported in
Table 2, if one examines notices and rules issued in the last November, December, and January of the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administrations,
and compares bundling to the notices and rules issued in those same months of
the year prior, one does not in fact see notable changes in bundling behavior.
This suggests that the modest effects noted above may derive from agency con-

162.

5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).

163.

Id. § 802(a).

164.

See Stiglitz, supra note 78, at 137. While it is true that rules before this period could be subject
to disapproval under the CRA, the November elections would provide more certainty as to
the relevant political dynamics that would make disapproval more or less likely.
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siderations of other congressional tools or reﬂect other dynamics outside of this
simple probing exercise.165
TABLE 2.
MIDNIGHT RULES AND BUNDLING

Mean Subjects
for “Midnight”
Rules
Final Rules
Proposed Rules

4.70
4.24

Mean Subjects
for Comparison
Rules
4.90
4.43

Difference
−0.19
−0.18

Note. For the purposes of this table, the “midnight” period is the time from the ﬁnal November to
the following January 20 of the second terms of Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama.
The comparison period consists of those months, one year earlier in those administrations. The
differences in bundling are not close to statistically signiﬁcant for either proposed or ﬁnal rules.

More generally, there is only tentative evidence that political factors drive
bundling behavior. The results suggest that elections may modestly drive down
bundling behavior for some rules. This is evident from the “election year” rows
in Table 1, which compare years with a congressional election against odd years.
These “election years” include all years with a congressional election, regardless
of whether there is a presidential election or not. In election years, we see a slight
downtick in bundling behavior, at least for ﬁnal rules. In those years with a presidential election, however, there are no signiﬁcantly discernable effects. These
results may reﬂect the increased incentives of those running for Congress to
highlight pending regulatory issues they regard as unpopular—a dynamic which
would also tend to discourage administrations from pressing controversial regulatory issues during election years. Overall, these preliminary exercises suggest
that congressional opposition and political salience may modestly inﬂuence
agency bundling behavior. Future research might consider other measures of
congressional threat to agencies as well as the differential impact of oversight on
various categories of rules and agencies.

165.
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from strategic considerations.

regulatory bundling

c. Courts
Finally, agency actions are subject to oversight by the courts, which can bundle and split regulations during litigation and in the remedial phase. During litigation, aggrieved parties can move to consolidate or coordinate judicial review
of separate regulations, or courts can sua sponte issue orders to do so. These
“batching” decisions are an exercise of courts’ powers to manage multiple lawsuits sharing common questions of law or fact.166 They amount to the judicial
ability to bundle or split rules under the auspices of a single case to review.
In the remedial phase, courts can vacate rules as a whole or simply sever individual provisions found to be illegal. To make this decision, courts usually apply a two-part test. First, they will ask whether the agency would have promulgated the rule even without the unlawful provision.167 If they determine the
agency would have, then they will ask whether the remainder of the rule would
still be operative.168 On remand, the action taken by the agency with respect to
that rule must comply with the court’s remedial decision. For instance, if the
agency addresses a provision that the court had previously vacated and severed
from the remainder of the rule, the provision may stand alone in the renewed
effort, effectuating a form of splitting. Alternatively, a reviewing court might determine that the agency has neglected a dimension of the problem. On remand,
agencies may decide to address those additional issues in a single rulemaking
that might otherwise have been treated separately.169
How agencies will behave in anticipation of judicial review is ambiguous as
a matter of theory. More judicial scrutiny could lead to more bundling, which
might help to obscure agency policy innovations. It may be harder for commenters, litigants, and judges to parse problematic parts of a rule that are bundled
with many unproblematic parts. Likewise, to the extent various issues addressed
in a rule appear interdependent, courts may be reluctant to meddle with any sin166.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)(1)-(2) (permitting courts to “join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions” and “consolidate the actions” if the “actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact”). The Ninth Circuit has designed rules to promote
efficiency by “‘batching’ . . . appeals that implicate analogous questions or similar legislation
before one argument panel and designating ‘lead cases’ in which the panel opinion would
affect a group of subsequent matters presenting a common issue.” Carl Tobias, Fourth Circuit
Publication Practices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1733, 1754 (2005) (citing NINTH CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMM., INTERIM REPORT 8-16 (Mar. 2000)).
167. See Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE L.J. 2286,
2296 (2015).
168. See id. Sometimes, agencies themselves include severability clauses to help inform the court’s
analysis, but the practice is uncommon. Id. at 2291.
169. See infra notes 243-247 and accompanying text.
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gle provision of the rule. Such dynamics would plausibly lead agencies to bundle
issues more often when they face the possibility of an antagonistic court. That
said, the relationship between agency bundling and judicial review could also
run the opposite way: agencies may bundle less under more scrutiny. For instance, if courts recognize the act of bundling itself as a potential foul, thus increasing the odds of a court setting aside a rule on arbitrariness or other
grounds,170 then agencies might decrease bundling in response. Put differently,
more forceful judicial policing could lead to more rule splitting by litigationaverse agencies.
By way of preliminary examination, consider the following measure of judicial scrutiny: the extent to which there is preference divergence based on the
partisan identity of the judge’s nominating party.171 The composition of the D.C.
Circuit is most relevant, as that circuit has the greatest focus on administrative
law matters.172 Moreover, because challenges to agencies’ rules almost never
reach the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit is in all likelihood the ﬁnal resting
place for administrative controversies.173 To produce the measure of preference
divergence, we ﬁrst determine the proportion of active judges in a given year on
the D.C. Circuit who were appointed by a Republican President.174 During Democratic regimes, we use this quantity as a metric of judicial-preference divergence; during Republican regimes, we use one minus this quantity as the relevant metric. Thus, larger ﬁgures reﬂect a larger number of D.C. Circuit judges
appointed by a President of the opposite party from the sitting President.

170.

See infra Section III.B.3.
There is a robust debate on the appropriate method for measuring judicial preferences. See
Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?,
29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133 (2009). Compare, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (taking a law and economics approach), with Adam Bonica & Maya
Sen, A Common-Space Scaling of the American Judiciary and Legal Profession, 25 POL. ANALYSIS
114 (2017) (using a scaling methodology). Future empirical work should extend the work here
using alternative measures of judicial ideology.
172. See John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L.
REV. 375, 376-77 (2006).
173. Cf. Adam Feldman, Looking Back to Make Sense of the Court’s (Relatively) Light Workload, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (Jan. 9, 2018), https://empiricalscotus.com/2018/01/09/light-workload
[https://perma.cc/FGR8-V4AT] (discussing the low number of cases actually decided each
term by the Court).
174. We calculate this quantity based on biographical data from the Federal Judicial Center. See
Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www
.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search [https://perma.cc/JQR9-84SS].
171.
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According to this measure, judicial scrutiny tends to be relatively high during
the ﬁrst term of an administration, before the sitting President has had an opportunity to appoint sympathetic judges to the court. During the ﬁrst terms of
Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump, for example, the average judicial scrutiny score is 0.62, indicating that almost two-thirds of the active judges
on the circuit were appointed by a President of the opposing political party. By
comparison, the average score during the second terms is 0.37, indicating that in
their second terms Presidents face judges appointed by a President of the opposing party closer to one-third of the time.175
The question of interest is whether agency bundling increases, decreases, or
is unaffected by changes in judicial scrutiny. Perhaps surprisingly, our initial results suggest that judicial-preference divergence is unrelated to bundling behavior, indicating that other regulatory actors may be more signiﬁcant. The correlation between judicial scrutiny and bundling is virtually zero.176 Moreover,
decomposing the regulatory actions along various dimensions results in the
same basic ﬁnding that no inﬂuence persists. There seems to be no relationship,
that is, between judicial scrutiny and bundling for proposed and ﬁnal rules by
executive and independent agencies. While other measures of judicial scrutiny
should be considered, these initial results may suggest that other institutional
monitors like the President and Congress are stronger motivators of bundling
behavior than the courts.
There are several potential explanations for these results. First, the splitting
incentives described above may operate on some rules and the bundling incentives described above may operate on other rules, combining to an essentially
null effect on average. In this scenario, judicial scrutiny does have signiﬁcant effects on bundling behavior, but the effects offset each other in the data. Second,
it is also possible that courts do not police this question of bundling as assidu175.

To provide context for these numbers, consider that the D.C. Circuit currently has eleven seats
for active judges. The data indicate that Presidents begin their terms with about seven judges
appointed by the opposing party, and end with about four judges appointed by the opposing
party, after three judges appointed by the opposing party vacate their seats for various reasons.
176. Speciﬁcally, the correlation between the two measures is 0.007, and it is not signiﬁcant at the
conventional level even with over ﬁfty thousand observations. More sophisticated examinations that look within presidential administrations or within agencies show the same pattern:
judicial scrutiny bears almost no relationship to bundling behavior, on average. See Jennifer
Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Bundling Supplementary Materials (unpublished manuscript) (on
ﬁle with authors). Of course, these null results may reﬂect heterogeneous effects: scrutiny
may increase bundling for some types of rules and decrease it for other types of rules, producing, on average, an effect that approaches zero. Such explanations call for further attention
and investigation. But to a ﬁrst approximation, there does not appear to be any relationship
between this measure of judicial scrutiny and our maintained measure of agency bundling.
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ously as they might.177 Finally, it may be that agencies do not much heed court
composition for a variety of reasons. For instance, agencies are unlikely to be able
to predict the partisan composition of their particular judicial panels. Many
panel assignments are random or otherwise inﬂuenced by factors outside the litigants’ control.178 It is therefore difficult for agencies to structure their rulemaking behavior in anticipation of a particular set of judges. Moreover, only a highly
limited proportion of agency rules are subject to litigation, and even then the
risks of such litigation are not always predictable ex ante.179 The remedies may
also not be clear in advance—courts often exercise their equitable discretion in
deciding whether to use vacatur as a judicial remedy.180
The standards that courts use to bundle and split rules during litigation are
also murky. The D.C. Circuit distinguishes between consolidated and coordinated cases, which result in either a single opinion or multiple judicial opinions,
respectively.181 The court does not, however, provide clear guidance on how
177.

See infra Section III.B.3.
See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Deﬁning Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1009 (2005)
(“In the Courts of Appeals, panels are the product of random draws of three among a larger
set of members of the court.”). But see Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the
Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 38
(2015) (ﬁnding “evidence that panels are nonrandom in four circuits: the D.C. Circuit, the
Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit”); Marin K. Levy, Panel Assignment
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 65, 81 (2017) (ﬁnding that courts did not
employ strictly random panel assignments during the time period of the study).
179. See Raso, supra note 148, at 89, 127.
180. See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 323 (2003) (describing “a variety of situations in which courts
have continued to adhere to the kind of ﬂexibility that is characteristic of traditional equitable
discretion” when deciding whether or not to vacate a rule after remand).
181. Consolidated cases in the D.C. Circuit are “treated as one appeal for most purposes” in that
they “follow a single brieﬁng schedule, they are assigned for hearing on the same day before
the same panel, argument time is allotted to the cases as a group, and they are decided at the
same time.” Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR D.C. CIR. 24
(July 2, 2018) https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL%20
-%20RPP%20-%20Handbook%202006%20Rev%202007/$FILE/HandbookJuly2018WITH
TOCLINKS.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLU9-5QL6]. D.C. Circuit internal procedural rules also
provide, however, that even after a case is consolidated, individual litigants still maintain the
ability to ﬁle separate motions. Id. Consolidation, in other words, yields a single judicial opinion informed by a single set of briefs and oral arguments. Coordinated cases, by contrast,
result in separate judicial opinions informed by separate briefs; they are still heard, however,
before the same judicial panel. See Gregory E. Wannier, How Many Suits Is Too Many? Consolidation and Coordination Possibilities in EPA Climate Litigation, CLIMATE L. BLOG (Oct. 22,
2010), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2010/10/22/how-many-suits-is-too
-many-consolidation-and-coordination-possibilities-in-epa-climate-litigation
[https://
perma.cc/M39S-Q4N5] (“Case coordination involves hearing multiple cases before the same
178.
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judges should choose one approach over the other, leaving it instead to their
managerial discretion. To illustrate what can be at stake, return again to the
Obama EPA’s greenhouse-gas regulations. Recall that EPA had initially opened
a single rulemaking docket, but then issued four separate rules dealing with carbon dioxide. The Endangerment Finding determined that carbon dioxide endangered “public health and welfare.”182 The Tailpipe Rule set emission standards for cars and light trucks.183 The Triggering Rule determined that the Clean
Air Act required major stationary sources to obtain construction and operating
permits.184 And the Tailoring Rule limited the requirement only to the largest
stationary sources.185
A coalition of businesses, interest groups, and U.S. Representatives ﬁled a
motion to coordinate review of all four rules before the same judicial panel.186 In
their view, “the cases [were] substantively interrelated so as to ‘amount[] to a
single policy approach’”—evidenced by EPA’s own concession that the rules are
“related.”187 These industry groups also characterized EPA’s opposition to their
motion as an attempt to dismiss their challenges based on standing principles,
particularly dealing with injury-in-fact and causation. Separate judicial review,
the industry groups argued, “could result in an attempt to call for ‘a more appropriate forum’ in every case, and thereby deny all forums for review.”188 One

182.

183.

184.

185.
186.
187.

188.

panel, with a goal of yielding complementary decisions in cases where challenges cover related
activities.”).
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496; 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codiﬁed at 40
C.F.R. ch. 1); see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2018).
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600;
49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538).
Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean
Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 50, 51, 70, 71).
Prevention of Signiﬁcant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
See Wannier, supra note 181.
More speciﬁcally, EPA’s argument was that “taken together . . . [these rules] will subject
[greenhouse gases (GHGs)] emitted from stationary sources to [Prevention of Signiﬁcant
Deterioration (PSD)] requirements, and limit[] the applicability of PSD requirements to
GHG sources on a phased-in basis.” Id. (ﬁrst and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Action to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits Under the Prevention of Signiﬁcant Deterioration
Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Finding of Substantial Inadequacy and
SIP Call, 75 Fed. Reg. 53892 (proposed Sept. 2, 2010) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52)).
Id. (citing Motion for Coordination of Related Cases at 16-19, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 10-1131)).
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potential motivation for their motion may have been the hope that the more legally tenuous and politically controversial aspects of the Triggering and Tailoring Rules would bring down the Endangerment Finding with it.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, EPA, as well as a coalition of nineteen states and the
City of New York, ﬁled a motion in opposition to coordination. While conceding
that the Timing and Tailoring Rules were interrelated enough to warrant consolidation (not mere coordination), the motion argued that combining review
of the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule would confuse courts with different administrative records and “entirely separate” legal questions.189 EPA also
pointed out that D.C. Circuit rules allowed petitioners to use evidence outside
the administrative record to establish standing, thus mitigating any justiciability
concerns.190 By opposing coordination, EPA was likely hedging its bets. Even if
the Agency met one judicial panel hostile to its efforts to address climate change,
it might still be able to salvage parts of its program before another, friendlier
panel.
iii. implications
This Part takes a step back to consider the phenomenon of regulatory bundling in terms of the rulemaking process. After reﬂecting upon the role of bundling during notice and comment, the next Section considers the broader implications of regulatory bundling for political monitors and the courts. If the
phenomenon derives from the inﬂuence of narrow special interests, then tools
like the single-subject rule or a line-item veto may be appropriate. Yet even if it
does not, revised doctrines of judicial review may nonetheless be wise to preserve
the value of public participation. At the same time, regulatory bundling can yield
beneﬁts. The normative desirability of these general reforms requires further
empirical analysis or a case-by-case approach attuned to the speciﬁc merits of a
particular bundling decision. While such tasks are beyond this Article’s scope, it
will still explore factors that may help inform such work and identify more speciﬁc avenues for potential study.

189.

Id. (quoting Respondent’s Opposition to Motion for Coordination of Cases and Cross-Motion for Consolidation of Consolidated Case No. 10-1131 with Consolidated Case No. 10-1073
at 16, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d 102 (No. 10-1131)).
190. Id.
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A. Regulatory Process
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, as its name suggests, requires agencies to
give notice of a proposed rule in the Federal Register and then provide parties
with an opportunity to submit comments.191 The agency must base the rulemaking upon consideration of those comments and include a statement of basis and
purpose in the ﬁnal rule adopted.192 Final rules adopted according to this procedure are generally considered legally binding.193 On the one hand, public comments can improve regulations by allowing information gathering, spurring political monitoring, and fostering public deliberation.194 On the other hand, the
process can also facilitate capture by special-interest groups, as well as politicize
an otherwise evidence-based issue.195

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
Id. § 553(c).
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 476-77 (2013).
See Michael A. Livermore et al., Computationally Assisted Regulatory Participation, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 977, 983-87 (2018).
See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures,
12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 330-38 (2009).
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FIGURE 4.
HISTOGRAMS OF BUNDLING SUBJECTS

To understand better how this process may inﬂuence bundling, consider Figure 4 above, which displays a histogram of the number of subjects in proposed
and ﬁnal rules. As is evident from the ﬁgure, the number of subjects is rightskewed, with many rules listing very few subjects, and a distinct minority of
rules listing a large number of subjects. Interestingly, ﬁnal rules tend to contain
more subjects than proposed rules; the average number of subjects in a proposed
rule is 4.4, and the corresponding average for ﬁnal rules is 4.7. This observation
may suggest that agencies are increasing bundling through the notice-and-comment process—perhaps a kind of “bundling creep” whereby agencies include additional issues in a ﬁnal rule. To examine this possibility, consider the evolution
of bundling within rulemaking efforts.196 We built a software program to match

196.

Note that earlier we examined the average number of subjects in proposed and ﬁnal rules
within agencies and found those correlations to be strong—agencies that list many subjects in
their proposed rules also do so in ﬁnal rules. Here, we look within rulemaking efforts.
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proposed rules with ﬁnal rules, thereby allowing us to examine how bundling
changes across a rule’s life cycle. Over the series, we identiﬁed almost 14,500
matches between proposed and ﬁnal rules, accounting for over three-quarters of
all proposed rules. The remaining rules may be unmatched for a number of reasons, including the fact that agencies frequently withdraw proposed rules or
simply choose not to ﬁnalize them.197
FIGURE 5.
BUNDLING IN PROPOSED AND FINAL RULES

197.

For the later parts of the series, many proposed rules will not have completed the rulemaking
process—a rule proposed in 2017, for example, is quite likely not to have been ﬁnalized in our
dataset; the “orphan” rate (rate of abandoned proposed rules) in 2017 is more than double the
rate at the start of the series. In other cases, our algorithm may miss references to proposed
rules in the ﬁnal rules, for instance, because the agency used a nonstandard citation or recorded the citation to the proposed rule incorrectly. However, we suspect such instances are
rare and, more importantly, essentially random. The algorithm works by searching ﬁnal rules
for references to proposed rules, and this may also lead to “false” matches, if, for example, a
ﬁnal rule cites distinct but perhaps related regulatory efforts. Based on an inspection of a random subset of matches, however, we believe the number of false matches to be relatively small
and, as above, to operate mainly to introduce an element of noise but not bias.
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Examining the evolution of bundling within a rulemaking effort reveals several features. First, most rules that start out with extensive bundling ﬁnish with
extensive bundling. The correlation between the number of subjects in proposed
and ﬁnal rules is strongly positive at 0.80. Figure 5 plots the number of subjects
in the ﬁnal rule against the number of subjects in the matched proposed rule. As
is shown by the darker shading, which indicates a density of rules, most rules
fall along the line of perfect correspondence. Second, consistent with the ﬁndings above, when rules change the number of subjects in a rulemaking effort,
they tend to increase them. This is also evident from Figure 5, which shows a
greater density of rules above the line of correspondence than below it.
Quantitatively, fully one-quarter of rules increase the number of subjects
listed during the rulemaking process. Almost seven in ten rules maintain the exact number of subjects throughout the process (sixty-nine percent); and fewer
than one in ten decreases the number of subjects from proposed to ﬁnal rule (six
percent).198 As an initial matter, it is possible these ﬁndings reﬂect agency coding
practices rather than substantive changes in the regulatory language—a kind of
measurement error. Because proposed rules are lower stakes than ﬁnal rules, rule
writers may not pay much attention to ensuring coding accuracy at the proposal
stage.199 Before ﬁnalizing rules, however, agencies may invest more time and effort in ensuring that the list of subjects is complete, as would the Office of the
Federal Register during review.200 Therefore, the increase in subjects at the ﬁnalrule stage may simply reﬂect more careful coding efforts. Mitigating this possibility, however, is the fact that public commenters can criticize agencies for incomplete lists of subjects.201 Such public scrutiny may help encourage agencies
to publish complete subject lists at the proposal stage too.
If so, the results above likely reﬂect the incentives generated by the noticeand-comment process in favor of more bundling at the ﬁnal-rule stage. Commenters might raise issues not initially contemplated by the agency, compelling
agency officials to address them more speciﬁcally in the ﬁnal rule. While agencies
are constrained by the judicial requirement to ensure that ﬁnal rules are a “logical

198.

Also note that, on average, agencies increase the number of subjects from proposed to ﬁnal
rule by almost a quarter unit (0.22).
199. See Emery Interview, supra note 75. Final rules, unlike proposed rules, are legally binding and
subject to litigation as ﬁnal agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018).
200. See Swidal Interview, supra note 41.
201. See, e.g., Letter from Emily Kirkpatrick, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Council of Teachers of English, to
Jennifer Bell-Ellwanger, Dir. of Policy & Program Studies Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 3 (Nov.
17, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-OS-0078-1354 [https://
perma.cc/J4QV-FUU8] (suggesting that the Department of Education “add ‘literacy’ to the
list of subjects” covered by a particular proposal).
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outgrowth” of proposed rules, the requirement has limited bite in practice.202 As
a result, agencies may address more issues in the ﬁnal rule to appease stakeholders who possess credible means of delaying or killing the regulatory effort.
Indeed, regulated entities could seek bundling for many reasons. Bundled
rules facilitate predictability and planning by simultaneously imposing various
regulatory obligations. Businesses can then invest in any necessary compliance
technology all at once, instead of on an inefficient, piecemeal basis. Bundled rules
could also be attractive to interest groups with wide-ranging agendas but narrow
windows of opportunity to capture a regulatory drafter. Successful lobbyists
might extract packages of perks and rewards as the opportunity arises. The revolving door, through which exiting regulators get hired by the regulated and
vice versa, may also facilitate mutually beneﬁcial relationships between agency
insiders and industry members.203 These relationships may result in logrolling
between repeat players. Agency staffers could trade off regulatory favors between
regulations at different points in time, thus resulting in rules with more provisions.
B. Innovative Controls
Regulatory bundling also offers new perspectives on the kinds of controls
available to agency monitors. While the standard account usually contemplates
the President, Congress, and the courts striking down entire regulations, the lens
offered here opens up new possibilities for the kinds of tools monitors can use
to exercise oversight. As discussed below, the normative desirability of bundling
and splitting remains contested and uncertain. The net effects require further
empirical examination, the conclusions of which should help inform whether

202.

See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting, in a discussion of the logical-outgrowth doctrine, that “the fact that a ﬁnal rule varies from a proposal, even substantially, does not automatically void the regulations”); Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d
1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) (parsing the logical-outgrowth analysis as requiring that “in the
ﬁnal analysis each case ‘must turn on how well the notice that the agency gave serves the
policies underlying the notice requirement’” (quoting Small Reﬁner Lead Phase-Down Task
Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983))); Small Reﬁner Lead, 705 F.2d at 548-49
(characterizing the logical-outgrowth requirement merely to demand that a party “should
have anticipated that such a requirement might be imposed”); cf. Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(declaring that a ﬁnal rule is not a “logical outgrowth” if it “is a brand new rule” or “where
interested parties would have had to ‘divine [the Agency’s] unspoken thoughts’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 2000))).
203. For a nuanced discussion of these dynamics, see Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2015).
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and the extent to which these reforms should be adopted. In anticipation of that
work, this Section explores the tools that various parties could employ to encourage or constrain regulatory bundling. In doing so, the Section also sheds
light on how current institutional practices may be inﬂuencing bundling decisions.
1. Line-Item Vetoes
Just as the line-item veto can be used to reduce the scope of bundled statutes,
so, too, can it be used to pare back bundled regulations. The line-item veto has
traditionally been understood as the ability of executive officials to cancel or nullify speciﬁc provisions of bills before signing them.204 While the mechanism has
been well studied in the statutory context,205 its implications for the regulatory
state have gone largely unexplored. One explanation may be the relatively mysterious nature of the OIRA review process. Few recognize, for example, that
OIRA exercises a form of the line-item veto for regulations.206 After agencies
submit their proposed and ﬁnal rules for review, OIRA has the ability to cross
out speciﬁc provisions and broader language unrelated to speciﬁc regulatory
costs or beneﬁts.207 Many have criticized this practice as legally illegitimate or
unwise intermeddling in agency expertise.208

204.

See Indridi H. Indridason, Executive Veto Power and Credit Claiming: Comparing the Effects of
the Line-Item Veto and the Package Veto, 146 PUB. CHOICE 375, 375 (2011).
205. See, e.g., Glenn Abney & Thomas P. Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for
Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship?, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 372 (1985); John R.
Carter & David Schap, Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (1990);
James A. Dearden & Thomas A. Husted, Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative
Examination of the Line-Item Veto, 77 PUB. CHOICE 707 (1993); James J. Gosling, Wisconsin
Item-Veto Lessons, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292 (1986); Pat Thompson & Steven R. Boyd, Use of
the Item Veto in Texas, 1940-1990, 26 ST. & LOC. GOV’T. REV. 38 (1994).
206. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1839 (observing that “the role of OIRA and the nature of the
OIRA process remain poorly understood”). One exception is Steven Croley who has observed
that “whereas the president lacks the ability to veto selective pieces of legislation, he enjoys a
‘line-item veto,’ so to speak, of agencies’ regulatory initiatives.” See Steven P. Croley, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 97
(2008).
207. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reﬂections on the Relationship Between the
Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 344 (2014) (describing
how OIRA “offered line-by-line edits of regulatory proposals”). This ability is referred to as
the “narrative veto” in the statutory context. See, e.g., Abney Glenn & Thomas P. Lauth, Gubernatorial Use of the Item Veto for Narrative Deletion, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 492 (2002).
208. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2045 (2015).
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Appreciating regulatory bundling, however, allows for a more nuanced assessment of the OIRA process. One hypothesis in the statutory context is that
the line-item veto is a salutary means for the President to cut back on logrolling
and pork-barrel politics.209 Indeed, this is often the rationale for OIRA review
itself—a means for a nationally conscious Executive to check mission-oriented
agencies who impose narrow regulatory costs.210 A competing hypothesis is that
the line-item veto results in an increase in special-interest bills.211 The possibility
of a veto itself, that is, can induce the proposer to include more pork-barrel provisions in the hopes that some survive the veto threat. In fact, some have observed this practice in the regulatory context. Agencies will often add provisions to draft rules as bargaining chips that “would be available” for agencies
“to give away” or use to negotiate during OIRA review in order to protect what
they perceive as the most important provisions of a rule.212
Most empirical work in the legislative context suggests that the line-item
veto produces either no discernible effect213 or an effect only under certain conditions, such as divided government.214 A natural question, then, is whether
these ﬁndings extend to the administrative state and how legislative, presidential, and agency preferences interact in the shadow of OIRA’s line-item veto.
Such evaluations could help inform a more meaningful debate about potential
reforms to the OIRA process. This debate, for example, might raise inquiries
analogous to those asked in the legislative arena. Instead of a line-item veto, for
example, perhaps OIRA should only be granted a “package veto” over the entire
regulation, rather than its parts.215 Would doing so result in a more productive
set of agency-White House dynamics or only more delay and ossiﬁcation? These

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

214.

215.

See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV. 403, 405
(1988).
See, e.g., Croley, supra note 140, at 873-76; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 2245, 2339-41 (2001).
See Robinson, supra note 209, at 414.
See Stuart Shapiro, The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA’s Ergonomics Rulemaking, 67 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 688, 693 (2007).
See Carter & Schap, supra note 205; Gosling, supra note 205; Indridason, supra note 204; Catherine C. Reese, The Line-Item Veto in Practice in Ten Southern States, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 510
(1997); Thompson & Boyd, supra note 205.
See Adam R. Brown, The Item Veto’s Sting, 12 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 183 (2012); Dearden &
Husted, supra note 205; cf. Abney & Lauth, supra note 205 (discussing the increased use of the
line-item veto in periods of divided government).
See Indridason, supra note 204, at 376.
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perspectives also open up other institutional possibilities such as a line-item congressional veto, which would likely require an amendment to the Congressional
Review Act.
2. Single-Subject Rules
Another potential innovation plainly relevant to regulatory bundling is a single-subject rule for the administrative state. Single-subject rules, as their name
suggests, traditionally require a lawmaking body to address only a single “subject” per legislative bill.216 Many state constitutions, for instance, impose such a
rule on state legislatures.217 The rationale varies from location to location, but
tends to be rooted in one of several concerns. The dominant one is that a piece
of legislation with multiple subjects might represent logrolling in which no individual provision enjoys majority support.218 Say a piece of legislation that contains issue A does not have majority support, so the drafters join issue B to the
bill. If a sufficient number of legislators favor issue B without strongly disfavoring issue A, the bill with both A and B will receive majority support. It might be,
however, that neither issue A nor issue B enjoys majority support on its own, but
that both issues become law by virtue of bundling. In this sense, a persistent fear
is that logrolling works for the beneﬁt of special-interest groups and at the expense of the general public.
Another fear is that allowing a piece of legislation to address multiple subjects may increase the size of government beyond the optimal level. Bundling

216.

See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803,
805 (2006).
217. Id. at 806; see also Rachael Downey et al., A Survey of the Single Subject Rule as Applied to
Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579 (2003) (surveying the application of the
single-subject rule to initiatives in select states); Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and
Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 103-04 (2001) (citing the single-subject rule
as an example of a procedural limitation imposed by a state constitution on the legislature);
John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the Single Subject Rule, 9
ELECTION L.J. 399 (2010) (discussing criticisms of aggressive enforcement of the single-subject rule); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative
Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 17 PUBLIUS 91 (1987) (citing single-subject rules as an
example of a state-level constitutional procedural limitation on state legislature); Jeffrey Gray
Knowles, Note, Enforcing the One-Subject Rule: The Case for a Subject Veto, 38 HASTINGS L.J.
563, 563 (1986) (discussing the use of a one-subject rule to reduce “pork barrel” legislation);
Courtney Paige Odishaw, Note, Curbing Legislative Chaos: Executive Choice or Congressional
Responsibility, 74 IOWA L. REV. 227, 229 (1988) (citing single-subject rules as one innovative
solution to pork-barreling at the state level).
218. See Gilbert, supra note 216, at 813-14.
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allows measures to enter law that, standing alone, would not become law, arguably leading to excessive legislation. Those opposed to the growth of government may thus seek a single-subject rule. This position, of course, relies on some
notion of the “optimal” size of government, a question about which there is no
clear consensus.219 Finally, another related concern is that bundling diminishes
political accountability. Returning to our example with issues A and B, it is challenging for observers—and in particular for voters—to know whether their representatives supported issue A or B. If issue B, say, turns out to harm voters’
interests, then the representative might plausibly defend himself by saying that
he, too, opposed issue B, but ultimately voted for the bill to win passage for issue
A. That statement may or may not be true and is difficult for the voter to evaluate, thus diminishing accountability.
Similar normative concerns could also motivate a single-subject rule for the
administrative state. Logrolling within an agency or across agencies could produce momentum for a regulatory effort that otherwise would stall. Similarly,
agency staff can attach provisions to rules that have been expedited by a political
appointee to meet a statutory deadline.220 These regulatory riders may escape
internal scrutiny due to the speed of rulemaking and receive only cursory review
by an agency head who is distracted by higher-priority components. Concerns
about the size of government also resonate in the regulatory context, as do
threats to accountability posed by unelected bureaucrats.221
A rule requiring regulations to deal with one subject at a time could be imposed by statute, executive order, or through judicial case law. How to deﬁne a
“subject” is notoriously difficult as a linguistic and conceptual matter, and different institutional actors will likely be informed by different motivating concerns.222 Congress, for example, may want to deﬁne a “subject” by reference to
its own legislative bundles. This approach may require agencies to issue regulations under one statutory grant at a time, rather than pursuant to multiple authorities that upset the preferences of a speciﬁc enacting Congress. By contrast,

219.

For an attempt to answer this question, see Allan H. Meltzer & Scott F. Richard, A Rational
Theory of the Size of Government, 89 J. POL. ECON. 914 (1981).
220. See Emery Interview, supra note 75.
221. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2011).
222. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject
Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 687 (2010) (“Logic and language cannot yield a precise deﬁnition of ‘subject.’”); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, 1 ELECTION L.J. 35, 47 (2002) (“The difficulty of applying the term ‘subject’ in a single subject
rule . . . is that by its very nature, the permissible content of a ‘subject’ is inﬁnitely and essentially malleable.”).
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the President may see it as part of his constitutional duty to regulate coherently
across all of his delegated authority. Thus, he may issue an executive order that
deﬁnes “subject” in ways that allow him to advance his particular priorities or
claim public credit more effectively.223
Alternatively, instead of specifying what a “subject” entails in advance, any
of these actors, including the courts, could simply impose a duty to explain why
a rule is bundled in a particular way. This approach would help mitigate the definitional problem, requiring agencies instead to provide a rationale at whatever
level of generality they deemed appropriate. For example, OIRA’s guidance under Trump’s two-for-one executive order requires agencies to explain how regulatory provisions are “logically connected.”224 OIRA then retains the authority
to split the regulations as necessary to ensure compliance with the executive order. Courts could similarly require regulatory provisions to be sufficiently related
and grant varying levels of deference to an agency’s bundling explanation, as
further discussed below. Because regulatory bundling often requires specialized
knowledge—for instance, how a program in area A is likely to affect a program
in area B—courts may not feel institutionally competent to assess the decision de
novo.
3. Judicial Review
Judicial review, then, represents another device that could be used to calibrate agencies’ bundling behavior. There are at least two doctrinal vehicles for
such intervention.
a. Soft Looks
Courts can and do police bundling decisions under arbitrariness review.225
This standard—whether or not an agency action is “arbitrary or capricious”—is

223.

At the state level, there is also the interesting dynamic of the plural or “unbundled” executive,
which may result in greater state-agency splitting to align with the interests of separate executives. See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1385, 1386-87, 1404 (2008).
224. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, M-17-21, GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13771, TITLED “REDUCING REGULATION AND CONTROLLING REGULATORY COSTS” 15 (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/ﬁles
/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA6Z-6WXK].
225. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018).
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generally understood as demanding evidence-based explanation.226 While
courts have sometimes described this as “hard look review,” they are also quick
to emphasize that such review should be “narrow” and not displace the agency’s
well-considered judgment.227 In practice, judges indeed appear to be deferential
to agencies under the arbitrary and capricious test, especially at the Supreme
Court228—perhaps invoking it only intermittently to ensure that it remains a
credible threat.
This general orientation—a “soft” rather than “hard” look, if you will—
seems appropriate when it comes to the review of regulatory bundling. One reason is that bundling can be understood as an agency choice about policy-making
form, a decision about which courts are generally deferential if the underlying
statute is otherwise silent.229 Agencies also possess the comparative expertise
necessary to assess the potential beneﬁts and harms of bundling. The practice
may, for example, lower compliance costs for regulated industries by imposing
one-time investments in technology. Indeed, this was the sensible rationale provided by a Department of Health and Human Services ﬁnal regulation consolidating into one rule what had previously been four proposed and interim ﬁnal
rules.230 Bundling could also reﬂect productive and necessary bargaining between agency actors and political monitors. These factors suggest that courts

226.

227.

228.

229.

230.

See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE
L.J. 2, 2 (2009) (“Current conceptions of ‘arbitrary and capricious’ review focus on whether
agencies have adequately explained their decisions in statutory, factual, scientiﬁc, or otherwise
technocratic terms.”).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“The
scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”).
See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1358,
1367 (2016) (observing that “agencies have won no less than 92 percent of . . . arbitrariness
challenges” in the Supreme Court and that “[t]he days of systematically aggressive hard look
review, as in the D.C. Circuit’s decisions from the 1970s and early 1980s, are mostly behind
us”).
See NLRB. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery
II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by
individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); Magill, supra note 1, at 1403-05.
Modiﬁcations to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notiﬁcation Rules
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modiﬁcations to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed.
Reg. 5566, 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codiﬁed at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (“This ﬁnal rule is
comprised of four ﬁnal rules, which have been combined to reduce the impact and number of
times certain compliance activities need to be undertaken by the regulated entities.”).
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should act with deference toward an agency’s decisions about its own bundling
practices.
At the same time, it is important for courts to continue to use arbitrariness
review to invalidate particularly troubling instances of bundling that lack sufficient justiﬁcation. Consider, for example, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in AFLCIO v. OSHA,231 which struck down OSHA’s Air Contaminants Standard rule.
The court applied a standard more stringent than arbitrary and capricious review
due to the underlying statute, but the case nevertheless illustrates an approach
that we view favorably.232 After the initial promulgation of “start-up” standards
based on already-existing federal requirements,233 OSHA had historically managed to issue regulations dealing with only 24 toxic substances, and it had addressed these substances only one at a time.234 In this bundled rulemaking, however, the Agency decided to attempt to deal with 428 substances all at once. In
OSHA’s view, “it would take decades to review currently used chemicals and
OSHA would never be able to keep up with the many chemicals which will be
newly introduced in the future.”235 Further, the OSHA chief stated that by treating over 400 substances in one regulation, the Agency could “make a 20-year
leap forward in the level of worker protection in a relatively short time.”236 Interested parties had only forty-seven days to comment on the entire rule, followed by a thirteen-day public hearing.237
The appeals court vacated the regulation due to the Agency’s failure to make
a separate scientiﬁc case for each individual substance’s health risks.238 While
acknowledging that the rulemaking may have been “the only practical way of

231.
232.

233.
234.
235.
236.

237.
238.

965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 970 (“‘Substantial evidence’ is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’ Under this test, ‘we must take a “harder look” at OSHA’s
action than we would if we were reviewing the action under the more deferential arbitrary
and capricious standard applicable to agencies governed by the Administrative Procedure
Act.’” (citations omitted) (ﬁrst quoting Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
522 (1981); and then quoting Asbestos Info. Ass’n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1984))).
Id. at 968; see 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (2018).
AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 971.
Id. (quoting Air Contaminants, 53 Fed. Reg. 20960, 20963 (proposed June 7, 1988) (to be
codiﬁed at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910)).
Frank Swoboda, OSHA Tightens Rules on Worker Hazards, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 1989),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/01/14/osha-tightens-rules-on
-worker-hazards/a71881b3-f6ce-401c-a03e-1dbd2378be5b
[https://perma.cc/HBQ3
-ULWM].
AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 969.
Id. at 987.
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accomplishing a much needed revision,” the court nonetheless expressed skepticism about the Agency’s method for doing so—even accusing the Agency of
being “misleading” in labelling its regulation as “generic.”239 In addition, the
Agency’s proffered reasons—in particular the need for expediency—were candid,
but unsupported by the evidentiary record.240 The court also complained that
the Agency’s extreme bundling stymied judicial review.241 As a result, the opinion was only able to provide representative problems with the rule and could not
address each of its ﬂaws.242 In this manner, a court was able to police a regulation
that had bundled provisions in a way that subverted public and judicial monitoring.
Interestingly, arbitrariness review has also been used by courts to set aside
rules that fail to consider other rules that are closely related. In Spirit of the Sage
Council v. Norton,243 for instance, a district court reviewed two rules issued by
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service
pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. The ﬁrst rule, the “No Surprises Rule,”
provided that landowners who submit a habitat conservation plan would not be
required to expend additional ﬁnancial resources or accept additional restrictions
on property use, so long as they abided by the terms of the plan.244 A subsequent
regulation, the “Permit Revocation Rule,” provided that the assurance of “no
surprises” could be revoked under certain circumstances.245 Without identifying
any substantive deﬁciencies, the district court held that the two rules were “sufﬁciently intertwined” and thus remanded the case to FWS so that the Agency
could jointly consider the related provisions.246 After the D.C. Circuit denied
FWS’s motion for a stay pending appeal, the agencies bundled the rules and solicited comments on what had previously been two separate rulemakings.247

239.

Id. at 972, 987 (noting that “the new Air Contaminants Standard is an amalgamation of 428
unrelated substance exposure limits” where “[t]here is little common to this group of diverse
substances except the fact that OSHA considers them toxic and in need of regulation”).
240. Id. at 986.
241. Id. (“OSHA has lumped together substances and affected industries and provided such inadequate explanation that it is virtually impossible for a reviewing court to determine if sufficient
evidence supports the agency’s conclusions.”).
242. Id. (noting that “[t]he individual substances discussed in this opinion are merely examples of
what is endemic in the Air Contaminants Standard as a whole”).
243. 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003), vacated as moot, 411 F.3d 225 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
244. Id. at 77.
245. Id. at 79.
246. Id. at 91.
247. Endangered Species Act Incidental Take Permit Revocation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 71723
(Dec. 10, 2004) (amending 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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b. Notice and Logical Outgrowth
Beyond arbitrariness review, courts can also play an important role in ensuring that agencies provide sufficient notice to public commenters, even when they
bundle. Courts, in other words, can ensure that those who seek to participate in
a rulemaking are given sufficient warning about an agency’s regulatory proposals.248 Recall OSHA’s rulemaking regulating 428 different substances. During litigation, industry groups complained that bundling so many substances
into a single rule impeded their ability to raise all their concerns.249 They complained that too many issues were presented with fewer than ﬁfty days to comment on all of them.250 On the facts and statutory background of AFL-CIO v.
OSHA, the court dismissed this concern.251 But one can imagine the adequacy
of notice playing a more important part in judicial review, especially as agencies
appear to be bundling at higher rates.
A related concern stems from the connection between the proposed rule and
the ﬁnal rule. If the ﬁnal rule is so different from the proposed one that it is not
a “logical outgrowth” of it, then commenters may not have had an adequate opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process—they were not sufficiently on
notice of what the agency might do.252 Courts have been using the logical-outgrowth doctrine to police the concern that ﬁnal rules will be written in ways that
could not be anticipated by would-be commenters.253 The worry is that agencies
keep their intended rules under wraps while proposing something only tenuously related to what they plan to impose.254 This doctrine may thus be another
tool through which courts police bundling, particularly if agencies tend to increase bundling through the notice-and-comment process.
***
While the above tools are important to consider in the administrative state,
whether they should be adopted requires further empirical work as to regulatory

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

253.

254.
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See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (requiring a “notice” of proposed rulemaking).
AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 969 n.8 (11th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 969 & n.8.
Id. at 969 n.8.
See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Small Reﬁner Lead Phase-Down
Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 352
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See
generally Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 856, 899 (2007) (arguing that the logical-outgrowth doctrine has imposed procedural
burdens on agencies that far exceed the minimal requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553).
See CSX, 584 F.3d at 1080.
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bundling’s causes and consequences. One future study might investigate, for example, whether OIRA’s line-item veto has in fact resulted in more burdensome
regulations as a result of the incentive to add costlier provisions for negotiation
purposes. Such a ﬁnding could lend support to the conclusion that OIRA should
no longer exercise a line-item veto. Other studies might consider whether variations in bundling across agencies systematically explain rates of public comment
or the quality of the input offered. If more bundling reduces the amount and
character of public participation, then one might decide that bundling should be
constrained. If, however, bundling facilitates more diverse participation and
higher-quality comments, then it may be salutary. Even if general empirical conclusions are possible, case-by-case assessments may nevertheless also be sensible
given the heterogeneity of rulemaking efforts. Even if one could aggregate the
effects of regulatory bundling, it nonetheless may be wise to consider the merits
of the practice in the context of speciﬁc rules or subject areas.
Further work is also needed to assess other possible consequences of regulatory bundling. On the one hand, as noted above, regulatory bundling can reﬂect
a strategic attempt by an agency to obfuscate or otherwise overwhelm the monitors of a particular rulemaking. The associated concern would be that unelected
bureaucrats are making policy without democratic accountability or due process
values like notice and participation. On the other hand, regulatory bundling may
also have more salutary motivations and consequences. For example, it may reﬂect deliberative compromises between agency actors and members of Congress
or the White House.255 Such deliberation may result in more information, creative policy making, and public-regarding results. It may also help facilitate rulemaking when parties with unrepresentative or extreme preferences otherwise attempt to block welfare-enhancing regulation. In this sense, bundling can serve
as a kind of commitment device.256 As previously noted, bundled rules could also
help to decrease compliance costs by allowing regulated entities to comply more

255.

Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justiﬁcation for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1511 (1992) (providing a “republican” defense of administrative law as a collaborative,
civic participatory enterprise).
256. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT,
AND CONSTRAINTS 88-92 (2000) (describing political constitutions as “commitment” devices). During negotiations over the proposed rule, the inability of an agency to commit to a
particular deal is a problem that could undo many attempted compromises. For example, an
agency might attempt to placate an interest group by promising some favored regulatory revision in the future. Yet the interest group may not trust the agency to follow through: after
all, there might be a change in agency personnel, or a shift in priorities due to exogenous
events. As a result, the interest group may challenge the immediate rule and thereby delay its
implementation for years. In response, the agency may bundle the change into the ﬁnal rule.
This allows the agency credibly to commit to the revision, thus forestalling any adverse action
contemplated by the interest group or political actor.
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efficiently through one-time technological investments. Bundling can also increase predictability and certainty about an agency’s policy choices regarding a
particular regulatory problem. For all these reasons, a normative appraisal of
regulatory bundling requires further empirical examination of the aggregate
consequences of the phenomenon. In the meantime, more case-by-case evaluations of the practice’s trade-offs would also be valuable.
conclusion
Administrative agencies can bundle and split their policy-making instruments. This Article has explored how they do so with respect to legislative rules.
It has identiﬁed the concept of regulatory bundling and proposed a way to operationalize it. The empirical analysis suggests that regulatory bundling is an increasingly common phenomenon. At the same time, agency practices vary
widely—some agencies bundle frequently, others rarely. Most agencies, however,
appear to bundle more as the rulemaking process unfolds, bundling more issues
into ﬁnal rather than proposed rules. These ﬁndings raise signiﬁcant normative
concerns that may be addressed through a suite of tools novel to the administrative state: single-subject rules, line-item vetoes, and innovative forms of judicial
review.
More broadly, this Article has sought to open up further lines of inquiry analogous to those explored by social scientists in the legislative context. Many research questions remain: What aspects of agency variation explain differences in
bundling behavior? Does regulatory bundling as a whole increase or decrease
social welfare? Relatedly, has OIRA’s line-item veto resulted in more or less regulatory costs? While administrative law has long allowed agencies ﬂexibility in
choosing their policy-making tools, the law’s normative concerns of notice and
participation demand further scrutiny of how these tools are aggregated and disaggregated in practice.
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appendix
A. Basic Summary Statistics, 2000-17

Proposed Rules
Final Rules

No. of Obs.
40823
18898

Mean
4.45
4.67

Std. Dev.
3.14
3.54

Max.
41
62

Min.
0
0

B. Table of Agency Abbreviations
Abbreviation

Agency Name

AID
ATBCB
CFPB*
CFTC*
CNSC
CPSC
DHS
DOC
DOD
DOE
DOI
DOJ
DOL
DOS
DOT
ED
EEOC
EPA
FCA
FCC*
FDIC*
FEC
FERC*
FHFA*

Agency for International Development
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Corporation for National and Community Service
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of Education
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Finance Agency
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FHFB
FLRA
FMC*
FRB*
FRTIB
FTC
GSA
HHS
HUD
ITC
LSC
MSPB
NARA
NASA
NCUA
NFAH
NIGC
NLRB
NRC*
NSF
NTSB
OCC*
OGE
OMB
OPM
PBGC
PRC*
RRB
SBA
SEC*
SSA
STB
TRE
TVA
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Federal Housing Finance Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board
Federal Trade Commission
General Services Administration
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Housing and Urban Development
United States International Trade Commission
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
National Archives and Records Administration
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Credit Union Administration
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities
National Indian Gaming Commission
National Labor Relations Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Science Foundation
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Office of Government Ethics
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Personnel Management
Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation
Postal Rate Commission
Railroad Retirement Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration
Surface Transportation Board
Department of Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority

2019
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USDA
USPS
VA

Department of Agriculture
United States Postal Service
Department of Veterans Affairs

Note. An asterisk (*) denotes an “independent” agency, as classiﬁed in the Paperwork Reduction
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2018). “Other” agencies include those agencies with names reported in
a nonstandard fashion. These agencies often engaged in little rulemaking.

C. Data Preparation
The Government Publishing Office (GPO) makes XML ﬁles of the Federal
Register available between the year 2000 and the present.257 We downloaded
those ﬁles and, initially, captured all entries in the “Proposed Rules” and “Rules
and Regulations” sections.258 Not all entries in those sections, however, are proposed or ﬁnal legislative rules. For instance, the Proposed Rules section also contains petitions for rulemakings.259 The Rules and Regulations section also includes “policy statements and interpretations of rules.”260 We thus had to screen
out entries that did not correspond to legislative rules.
The analytic distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules, however, is notoriously “hazy.”261 Generally speaking, legislative rules are those rules
that are legally binding on the agency, courts, and the public.262 They are required to go through notice-and-comment.263 Nonlegislative rules, by contrast,

257.

Bulk Data, OFF. FED. REG. (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/reader-aids
/developer-resources/bulk-data [https://perma.cc/5Q8D-2M8F].
258. According to the National Archives, each Federal Register issue is organized into four categories: (1) “Presidential Documents, including Executive orders and proclamations”; (2) “Rules
and Regulations, including policy statements and interpretations of rules”; (3) “Proposed
Rules, including petitions for rulemaking and other advance proposals”; and (4) “Notices,
including scheduled hearings and meetings open to the public, grant applications, and administrative orders.” See About the Federal Register, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.,
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/the-federal-register/about.html [https://perma
.cc/XAB3-3L53].
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing the “spectrum”
between interpretive and legislative rules as a “hazy continuum”); Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d
349, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
262. See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120
YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010).
263. See Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the
Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 2-3 (1994).
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merely clarify rather than create new obligations; they are exempt from noticeand-comment.264 Sorting between these two categories is difficult in practice, as
evidenced by the many muddled tests used by lower courts.265 Knowing that
individually scrutinizing thousands of rules would be unworkable in practice, we
searched for a simple sorting mechanism that could be operationalized. We observed that the D.C. Circuit looks to whether an agency has published a rule in
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as a “snippet” of evidence that the rule
is legislative in character.266
While acknowledging that CFR publication is just one factor of many,267 we
adopted a two-step procedure using the simple criterion. First, under the Office
of the Federal Register’s Document Drafting Handbook, proposed and ﬁnal
rules that modify the CFR must contain “words of issuance.”268 In the case of
proposed rules, these words represent an “expression that connects the preamble
to the regulatory text and the tie between the proposed rule and the CFR units
you propose to change.”269 This is a helpful textual cue, as most nonlegislative
actions do not affect the CFR and therefore would not contain words of issuance.
By contrast, virtually all legislative rules would affect the CFR and therefore
would contain words of issuance.
The words of issuance, the Handbook continues, are “always in the present
tense and use the word ‘propose’ or ‘proposes.’”270 The Handbook also advises
that other relevant verbs to include in the words of issuance are “amend,” “add,”
“revise,” and “remove.” Examples include: “For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to amend 10 CFR part 430
264.

Nonlegislative rules are often also referred to as “guidance documents.” See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneﬁciaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 399
(2007) (“Guidance documents can closely resemble legislative rules, leading some to call them
‘nonlegislative rules.’”).
265. See Franklin, supra note 262, at 286-89 (summarizing various approaches and observing how
“difficult” they often are to apply in practice).
266. See Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that
CFR publication is no more than “a snippet of evidence of agency intent”).
267. The D.C. Circuit has identiﬁed various objective indicia of a legislative rule: (1) CFR publication; (2) an adequate legislative basis for the agency action without the rule; (3) explicit invocation of general legislative authority; or (4) an effective amendment to a previous legislative rule. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
268. Office of the Fed. Register, Document Drafting Handbook: August 2018 Edition, NAT’L ARCHIVES
& RECORDS ADMIN. 2-2 (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.archives.gov/ﬁles/federal-register
/write/handbook/ddh.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN9Z-7HMS].
269. Id. at 2-16.
270. Id.
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as follows” and “For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission proposes to revise 47 CFR part 430 to read as follows.”271
We detect these words of issuances using a regular expression that searches for
some variant of “propose” near one of those verbs, followed by a reference to the
CFR or Code of Federal Regulations. As a ﬁrst screen, we then remove those
entries in the Proposed Rules section of the Federal Register that do not contain
words of issuance. We apply the same basic methodology drawn from the Handbook to the Rules and Regulations section to attempt to isolate ﬁnal rules. In this
manner, the words-of-issuance screen likely removed most entries not related to
legislative rulemakings. That said, some nonlegislative rules like rules of agency
procedure can still affect the CFR. We therefore required a secondary screen to
remove such procedural rules. This screen examined the rulemaking titles to remove rules with titles that refer to “procedure” or otherwise contain the term,
“procedural.”
All in all, this two-step procedure removes a substantial number of entries in
the Federal Register. The original, unscreened dataset contained roughly 43,500
entries in the Proposed Rule section and 68,000 entries in the Rules and Regulations section. The words of issuance screen removed over 24,000 entries from
the Proposed Rule section and about 25,500 entries from the Rules and Regulations section. The procedural rule screen, in turn, removed a further 400 entries
from the Proposed Rule section and about 1,700 entries from the Rules and Regulation section. As a check on these screening procedures, we then tasked a research assistant with reviewing a random sample of entries (n = 130). We asked
her to assess independently whether each entry represented a legislative rule. According to the research assistant’s coding, ninety-six percent of the rules in the
sample were legislative in nature.272 Our own review suggests that the proportion of legislative rules may be slightly higher due to reasonable disagreements
about particular cases (such as those involving technical amendments). This exercise supports the basic efficacy of our screening protocol.
D. Redundancy-Adjusted Measure
Under the Office of Federal Register’s Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, many
of the subjects exist in a hierarchical relationship to other subjects, with more
precise terms falling under more general terms.273 For instance, “air taxis” is a

271.

Id. at 2-17.

272.

The ninety-ﬁve-percent conﬁdence interval on this sample proportion is (.92, .99).
273. See Office of the Fed. Register, Federal Register Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, NAT’L ARCHIVES &
RECORDS ADMIN. (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.archives.gov/ﬁles/federal-register/cfr
/thesaurus.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTK5-DGJY].
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speciﬁc example of “air transportation,” and both terms exist as permissible entries in the thesaurus that agencies might list in their rules. When agencies list
both terms, the number of listed subjects may be greater than the number of true
subjects in a meaningful way. Some of the listed subjects, that is, are redundant:
adding a broader term to a more speciﬁc term does not increase the number of
subjects addressed in a rulemaking effort. To account for this possibility, we wish
to develop a redundancy-adjusted measure of the number of subjects.
There are various ways that one might address this problem. A standard
technique in natural-language processing involves reducing the dimensionality
of the word-space by using, for instance, singular value decomposition or topic
modelling. Likewise, scholars often attempt to reduce a large set of variables to
a smaller set of factors using principal components analysis or similar techniques. Doing so facilitates subsequent statistical analysis and may make the data
more interpretable. Finally, in ﬁnancial analysis, many measures of portfolio diversiﬁcation exist, all of which provide some sense of how much “overlap” there
is in a portfolio, a question not far from the present interest.
All of these techniques have downsides. For example, generally one must select the number of factors or topics to model when reducing the dimensionality
of the data. Algorithms and rules of thumb exist to help select the number of
factors, but it is impossible to escape a degree of arbitrariness. More importantly,
introducing a reduced-dimensionality representation of the data can in fact impede intuition and interpretation—it is often not clear to what the various factors
or topics produced by these techniques refer. Nor is it obvious how to produce
from these reduced-dimensionality representations an intuitive sense of how
“many” subjects to which a given rule relates. Most importantly, these techniques do not take advantage of the structure known to exist in the data: the
thesaurus tells us about the relationship between more speciﬁc and more general
terms.
To adjust the number of subjects, we thus adopt a simple algorithm that exploits the fact that the thesaurus informs us of the semantic structure of the
terms. Consider the thesaurus entry for “air transportation”274:
Air transportation
See also

274.

Id. at 6.
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Air taxis
Air traffic control
Aircraft
Airmen
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Airports
Airspace
Aviation safety
Charter ﬂights
Military air transportation
Navigation (air)
The thesaurus uses “see also” to “[r]eference [the] user to narrower and related terms.”275 This structure tells us that “air taxis” is a more speciﬁc term under the heading of “air transportation.” Using this structure, we ﬁrst convert the
thesaurus into a database in which each listed “general” term is associated with
any relevant more “speciﬁc” term. Second, we examine each listed subject for
each rule, probe whether it is a general term, and if so, determine whether any
of the speciﬁc terms listed by the agency appear as separate entries for that rule.
If that is the case, then we depreciate the general term from the count of the
number of subjects for that rule. If not, we retain the general term, as no more
speciﬁc substitute exists in the list of subjects for that rule. To take an example,
if the rule listed “air taxis” and “air transportation,” our simple algorithm would
produce a count of one, as we effectively remove “air transportation” from the
list of subjects. At the same time, if it listed only “air taxis” or only “air transportation,” the count would likewise be one.
It turns out that agencies commonly list both more general and more speciﬁc
terms, but that it does not affect the qualitative features of the data. For instance,
nearly sixty percent (roughly 66,500) of the ﬁnal or proposed rules in the dataset
require the depreciation of at least one general term. However, the adjusted and
unadjusted measures correlated strongly, r = 0.96. As robustness exercises, we
reestimated the empirical analyses presented in the body of this Article. Qualitatively, the results tend to remain stable under the adjusted measure.276
E. Alternative Measures
In the interest of transparency and to give a sense of how other possible
measures of bundling map on to this inquiry, consider the following replications
of Figures 1 and 4 and Table 1 from the Article.

275.

Office of the Fed. Register, History of the Thesaurus of Indexing Terms and the CFR Index
(unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with authors).
276. See Nou & Stiglitz, supra note 176. The one result that does seem to change under this adjusted
measure relates to bundling during the midnight period: we ﬁnd somewhat less bundling in
the midnight period with the adjusted measure.
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The top panel of Figure A1 plots the trends over time in bundling as measured with the (log) number of words in the rulemaking document (i.e., including the rule or proposed rules, as well as any preamble material). There, one sees
that the trends in the (log) number of words qualitatively tracks that presented
in Figure 1: broadly, an increase over time in bundling activity. Moreover, one
likewise sees the dip in bundling in 2017 with this measure. The bottom panel of
the Figure presents the corresponding results when bundling is measured with
the (log) number of sections referred to in the rule.277 The patterns for this
measure seem roughly to follow those reported in the Article, though the trend
is fainter and noisier. One continues to see, though, the dip in bundling in 2017.

277.

We add one to the number of sections so as to avoid logging a zero; we record zero sections
for about ten percent of the rulemaking entries in the dataset.
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FIGURE A1.
REPLICATION OF FIGURE 1

Table A1 replicates Table 1 from the Article using the alternative measures.
While some of the results are similar, there are also some meaningful differences—particularly regarding executive versus independent agencies—that are
worthy of further exploration.
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Finally, Figure A2 replicates Figure 4 from the main body of the text, again
now using the alternative measures. There we see that, as with the preferred
measure, these measures modestly exhibit right-skew, even after log transformations. The bottom panel, which displays the pattern for the number of sections, also suggests the coarseness of this measure. That coarseness may explain
why it is challenging to replicate the main results using this particular alternative
measure.
FIGURE A2.
REPLICATION OF FIGURE 4
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